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COMMENTS
USING DATA EXCLUSIVITY GRANTS
TO INCENTIVIZE CUMULATIVE
INNOVATION OF BIOLOGICS’
MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
ERIC LAWRENCE LEVI*
The pharmaceutical market is divided into two types of compounds: smallmolecule chemical compounds and large-molecule biologics. Due to biologics’
molecular sizes and the current scientific state of biologics manufacturing,
manufacturing facilities and processes require frequent reassessment to ensure
production of safe, pure, and potent therapeutics. Manufacturers utilize
patent and drug regulatory law to protect their investments and
simultaneously signal where innovation and investment are lacking. The
current four- and twelve-year regimented structures of the Biologics Price,
Competition, and Innovation Act do not keep pace with scientific development;
biologics manufacturing processes drift with time, and if a manufacturer can
obtain a higher degree of process control, then it should not feel restricted to
wait until their exclusivity period lapses. Currently, the FDA rarely grants
market exclusivity privileges for manufacturing process improvements alone;
hence, manufacturing processes—or at least large portions thereof—are
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typically withheld as trade secrets or strategically claimed within companion
composition claims. As a result, significant opportunity exists in regulatory
framework to incentivize the research and development of biologics
manufacturing processes. By creating a one- to four-year data exclusivity
extension opportunity, manufacturers will feel more comfortable reinvesting
their returns on investment towards manufacturing efficiency, and
manufacturers can capitalize on the complex-molecule nature of their biologic.
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“We try to remember that medicine is for the patient. We try never to forget
that medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits follow, and
if we have remembered that, they have never failed to appear. The better we
have remembered it, the larger they have been.”
—George W. Merck1
INTRODUCTION
Medical innovation continues to skyrocket, giving us artificial
hearts, medical imaging software, advanced prosthetics controllable
with the mind, and pharmacological cures for a plethora of
dangerous diseases.2 Notwithstanding our great strides to curtail
certain genetic and biologic maladies, cancer and rare diseases in
their various forms continue to proliferate.3
Legislators and
regulators thus seek to incentivize this type of dramatic innovation
while controlling patient costs and ensuring access to medicines.
This Comment attempts to explain and offer solutions for how
patent and drug regulatory law address—or fail to address—
commercialization and manufacturing inefficiencies when there are
high barriers to biopharmaceutical product entry, particularly in the
context of biologics. By working in tandem, patent law and drug
regulations signal to the next generation of scientists, manufacturers,
1. MEDICINE IS FOR THE PATIENT, NOT FOR THE PROFITS 11 (1950).
2. For example, Crizotinib, a drug formed from living cells and carrying a price
tag of $50,000 per treatment, has been hailed as a miracle drug. It has
singlehandedly eradicated certain subtypes of lung cancer once thought terminal in
patients. AUSTL. DEP’T OF HEALTH, CRIZOTINIB, 200 MG CAPSULE, 60 AND 250 MG
CAPSULE, 60, XALKORI®, PFIZER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD. 5 (Mar. 2014),
http://www.pbs.gov.au/industry/listing/elements/pbac-meetings/psd/2014-03/criz
otinib-psd-03-2014.pdf.
For a discussion of the potential revolutionary impact of a gene editing technique,
CRISPR/Cas9, and how it is now being utilized in laboratories, see Yannis
Grammatikakis, Next Big Thing in Genome Modification: The CRISPR/Cas9 System, NAT’L
INSTS. HEALTH (Apr. 20, 2015), https://irp.nih.gov/blog/post/2015/04/next-bigthing-in-genome-modification-the-crispr-cas9-system; Thom Patterson, Unproven
Medical Technique Could Save Countless Lives, Billions of Dollars, CNN (Oct. 30, 2015,
7:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/health/pioneers-crispr-dna-genome-editing.
3. Stacey Simon, Cancer Statistics Report: Death Rate down 23% in 21 Years, AM.
CANCER SOC’Y (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.cancer.org/cancer/news/news/cancerstatistics-report-death-rate-down-23-percent-in-21-years.

ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

914

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/13/2017 6:37 PM

[Vol. 66:911

regulators, and business leaders where innovation and investment are
lacking, encouraging smart innovation and investment. Designing
biological products requires extensive investment and up-front
development costs; similarly, biologics manufacturers require more
process control compared to their small-molecule counterparts.
Therefore, so that manufacturers produce cheaper, safer, and
more effective biologic and biosimilar cancer and rare-disease
therapies (a.k.a. biobetters),4 Congress should provide greater
incentive for manufacturing process innovation, disclosure, and
societal health impact projections than those currently offered by the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA).5 Because
small changes in biologics manufacturing processes require extensive
comparability testing,6 manufacturers focus on comparing and
mimicking biological products within tight preexisting constraints
rather than developing and proving societal health benefits ancillary
to manufacturing innovation.7 These alternative processes can result

4. See Mark McCamish & Gillian Woollett, The State of the Art in the Development of
Biosimilars, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 405, 405 (2012) (finding
that altering earlier manufacturing processes empowers developers to evaluate prior
biologics and commercialize a higher-quality and more cost-effective drug).
Biobetters encourage manufacturing efficiency, new therapeutic uses, and lower
consumer costs. Competitive Strategies in Life Sciences: Biobetters Versus Biosimilars,
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2011) [Hereinafter Biobetters Versus Biosimilars],
https://www.financierworldwide.com/competitive-strategies-in-life-sciences-biobetter
s-versus-biosimilars (“[B]iobetter[s] will show improvement in one or more attributes
over the original biologic, for example, in the form of a better side effect profile, faster
action, lower dosing, or different form of delivery.”). These precision medications will
simultaneously respond quicker to stimuli, minimize safety risks associated with
immunological responses, and drive down production and consumer costs. See Helen
Roe, The Rise of Biosimilars in Cancer Care, 24 BRITISH J. NURSING S28, S29 (Oncology Supp.
2015) (illustrating how biosimilars can be designed for different tumor groups, when
previously there would have been only one drug for all).
5. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) was enacted as part
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001–
7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010).
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., DRAFT GUIDANCE:
COMPARABILITY PROTOCOLS FOR HUMAN DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS:
CHEMISTRY,
MANUFACTURING, AND CONTROLS INFORMATION 1, 3–4 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM496611.pdf.
7. Biologics and biosimilars—a regulated and discrete technology—have not
developed into a statistically significant data set required to evaluate manufacturers’
specific focus, but “products of discrete technology industries [that] tend not to
comprise integral components of some larger product or system . . . [and generally]
do not enable the development of a wide array of ancillary products.” Robert P.
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in anything from clinically tested child dosing regimens8 to brandnew therapeutic uses,9 illustrating how manufacturing processes can
deliver return on investment (ROI) or fail to recoup costs. But
innovators currently lack adequate incentives to develop and protect
subsequent biologic manufacturing process improvements because
the data and market exclusivity periods set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 262
are insufficient for an originator biologic manufacturer to (1) recoup
its initial investment and (2) develop, test, and patent biobetter
processes. By examining and correcting these deficiencies, and by
offering a more flexible regulatory scheme rather than a one-size-fitsall paradigm, the signaling and notice functions inherent in patent
and drug regulatory law will guide the next generation of innovators
and corporations toward smarter investing in the biologics
manufacturing improvements that best improve societal health.
Biologics manufacturing processes create unique opportunities for
sponsors and manufacturers to leverage existing patent rights and
obtain justified exclusivity while enhancing societal health. To best
allow manufacturers to take advantage of these opportunities,
legislative corrections must be made whereby the governmental grant
of exclusivity built into the BPCIA would require showing projected
societal health impact. Additionally, the societal impact should
correspond with a tiered market exclusivity system such that
manufacturers maintain the incentive to conduct further research
and development (R&D) on existing rights while pursuing opportune
protection of any supplemental high-quality innovation. The recent

Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839, 880–81 (1990).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 262(m) provides a pathway for approval of child dosing regimens,
but manufacturers should have the incentive to pursue these regimens on their own
accord while attempting to enhance manufacturability, thereby lowering risk
financial risk with multiple facets of potential protection and exclusivity. See W.
Nicholson Price II, Innovation Policy Failures in the Manufacturing of Drugs, in FDA IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 354–55 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Price, Innovation Policy Failures] (arguing that the FDA’s role in
encouraging pediatric studies could also be used to encourage innovative
manufacturing methodology).
9. See Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (“Depending on the process to
create biobetters, the platform may also be applicable to more than one product,
thus saving substantial development dollars,” as was the case for Aranesp, launched
prior to the expiration of original patents covering EPO).
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decision in Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc.10 and the pending litigation of
AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc.11 illustrate the serious concern reference
product sponsors (“RPS”) have for obtaining and maintaining market
exclusivity—these barriers for follow-on biologics (“FOB”)
manufacturers must be predictable and valuable whenever an
applicant seeks market and data exclusivity. The inherent value of
biologics manufacturing processes will either be disclosed for public
knowledge or concealed as a trade secret, exemplifying the trade-offs
in the patent-or-trade-secret dichotomy.12 Increased disclosure of
firms’ biologics manufacturing processes—both by biosimilar and RPS
applicants—will enhance biological agent efficacy, purity, and safety
across the industry. Furthermore, as scientific understanding of
biologics moves “from [a] reductionistic understanding of biochemical
pathways to organism-level models[, a bridge will be built] between
current empirical methods of drug candidate evaluation and new
models of drug development.”13 Therapeutic treatments are impacted
by both the unique characteristics of biologics manufacturing
processes and recent judicial decisions, illustrating that
biopharmaceuticals should be the most innovative and scientifically
current methodology for personal and precise therapeutic care.14
By rewarding manufacturers for their enhanced process knowledge
with a tiered data exclusivity system,15 manufacturers will re-invest in
drug quality, efficacy, and safety improvements while passing on
lower costs to consumers.16 The shorter yet predictable FDA data
exclusivity grants are best capable of incentivizing biologics
manufacturers to innovate and disclose improved manufacturing
methodology because of the constant refinement and reassessment
inherent in biologics manufacturing. In the rare disease market,
where competition is often sparse, innovators require additional
10. 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016) (holding
FOB sponsors must provide 180-day notice of commercial marketing to the RPS,
after approval of their FOB but prior to marketing the FOB).
11. Complaint, AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 16-666-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 4, 2016).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. J. Woodcock, “Precision” Drug Development?, 99 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 152, 153 (2016).
14. See
Innovation
Saves,
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INNOVATION
ORG.,
http://innovationsaves.life (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (describing how innovation in
biologics saves lives and money).
15. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 343, 354–55 (correlating
manufacturing design changes with innovative value).
16. Woodcock, supra note 13, at 153.
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incentive to improve their manufacturing processes because there is
less fear of competitor FOB manufacturers utilizing a more efficient
or efficacious manufacturing process.17 For biologics and biosimilars
to capture market share quicker, customers and clinicians must view
the incremental advantages of biologics over small-molecules as
worthwhile given the price difference; therefore, innovator biologics
manufacturers should have the first opportunity—before the
conclusion of market exclusivity—to provide scientific data
supporting the therapeutic value of their medications compared to
any small- or large-molecule drugs.
This would advance BPCIA’s two-fold mission: (1) providing
sufficient incentives for continuous innovation in biologic therapies
(i.e., promoting innovation) and (2) lowering the price of biologic
therapies (i.e., promoting accessibility),18 as well as the Constitutional
goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts” for
societal benefit.19 Innovative value and public accessibility go handin-hand when determining price. Because biologics manufacturers
possess first-hand biologics-process-based scientific knowledge of
safety, efficacy, and potency, they can project societal health
improvements relatively accurately.
Similarly, the value of biopharmaceutical therapeutics change as
scientific knowledge develops. Justifying exorbitant prices for a
single pharmaceutical becomes harder as generics and FOBs respond
to market demands and statutory exclusivities or patent grants expire.
Thus, recurring opportunities for biologics manufacturers to leverage
previous grants and obtain an additional FDA grant of data exclusivity
or PTO patent grant will lower biologics prices; even though
exclusivity lends itself to short-term price hikes, greater flexibility
enables greater efficiency as grants enable drug prices to closely track
the actual need and demand of the drug.20 Lower prices will make
17. Carefully calibrated data exclusivity periods can identify and reward socially
beneficial investment. Sarah Sorscher, Note, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?:
Considering the Implications of Data Exclusivity as a Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 285, 302 (2009). Furthermore, sponsors can pursue patent grants to target areas
not covered by data exclusivity. Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic
Patents Passé?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 249 (2013).
18. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001(b),
124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010) (“It is the sense of the Senate that a biosimilars pathway
balancing innovations and consumer interests [i.e., accessibility] should be established.”).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. Enabling more “smaller steps” in exclusivity grants achieves the lowest
possible price in the long run, as opposed to twelve-year leaps, which will keep

ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

918

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/13/2017 6:37 PM

[Vol. 66:911

the market accessible to more customers while incentivizing highquality innovation that more accurately reflects market forces and
needs rather than arbitrary legislative grants, allowing the new
biological products marketplace to adapt and keep pace alongside
scientific advancements in biologics manufacturing processes.
Part I of this Comment illustrates how biological products capture
market share and sets up how drug regulatory law may be used as a lever
to adjust incentives to promote disclosure of biologics manufacturing
processes. Part II examines FDA requirements for grants of exclusivity
and how biosimilars subsequently gain market approval. Part III
analyzes the trade-offs between patents and trade secrets under 35
U.S.C. § 112’s claim scope disclosure requirements. Part IV applies
property law to the biologics and biosimilars abbreviated pathway
framework to assess current manufacturing process protection risks and
opportunities. Subsequently, Congress should create a tiered data
exclusivity system because biologic-specific FDA grants of data exclusivity
and early investments in improving patented processes enhance drug
quality and more accurately reflect the realities of a complex and everchanging scientific and financial landscape.
I.

THE INCREASING BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT MARKET SHARE

Eliminating cancer cell-by-cell may seem like an impossible task,
but what if an army of tiny, “incredibly sophisticated killing
machines”21 are grown to bear the brunt of that work? Indeed,

overall biopharma prices higher, long-term. The assumptions inherent in exclusivity
indirectly curing high price include:
(1) the innovator discloses sufficient
information to incentivize high quality follow-on biologics manufacturing processes,
(2) the innovator has an incentive to adapt and perfect their current biologics
manufacturing processes, and (3) biologics (and the exclusivities which facilitate
novel medicine market growth) in the long run will be cheaper for consumers than
their small molecules. Thus, getting the most societally beneficial biologics approved
and into the market quicker in order to pave the way for biosimilars and other new
biologics, will lead to lower health-care costs.
With greater flexibility comes great efficiency—i.e., grants are proportional to the
innovation. In some cases, it may lead to higher drug prices when warranted, but for
the most part it will more closely track the actual need and demand of the drug,
while conforming to a less artificial, one-size-fits-all regulatory model. Twelve to
twelve-and-a-half years makes little sense for some incremental advancement; but for
a major advancement, it could be paramount.
21. On Assignment: Hacking Cancer, NBC NEWS (May 20, 2016, 8:14 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/widget/video-embed/690231363507 (quote appears at
3:35 in video).
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biopharmaceuticals—or biologics22—allow clinicians to create
personalized and precise therapeutic plans of attack for cancer and
cancer-causing agents. “The importance of biologics lies in their
structural and functional variety,” enabling clinicians and pharmacists
to treat diseases not effectively treated with small-molecule drugs.23
But sophistication and complexity come with a high price tag,
increased health risks, and more stringent regulatory standards.
These barriers to innovation and biopharmaceutical market entry are
balanced with Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) grants of patent
rights as well as two types of Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
grants of valuable innovator exclusivity—a statutory grant of market
and data exclusivity through the BPCIA.24
Traditional
patent exclusivities prevent FOB manufacturers from using, selling,
or importing the patented biologic25—effectively granting the right to
exclude others from the market by suing for huge damages awards—
while data exclusivities prevent FOB manufacturers from using the
RPS’s clinical trial data when submitting an abbreviated biologicals
license application (aBLA) and market exclusivities preclude the FDA
from approving an aBLA. Essentially, data exclusivity inhibits the
development
of
FOB
manufacturing
processes
and
market exclusivity prevents the FDA from approving an FOB,
prolonging FOB market entry.
Most biologics manufacturers will take advantage of redundancies in
exclusivity grants. Because manufacturers pursue safe, efficacious, and
pure biologics to gain approval by the FDA, they often develop
22. Kate S. Gaudry, Exclusivity Strategies and Opportunities in View of the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 587, 587 (2011) (explaining
that biological products, biologies, or “[b]iologics are a class of drugs or vaccines that
are produced by manipulating a living tissue or microorganism”).
23. Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do
We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 422 n.4 (2012).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012). For an in-depth look at the legislative history
outlining developments of the biologics and biosimilars pathway, illustrating
bargaining between generics, innovators, and the FDA, see generally Krista Hessler
Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671 (2010).
25. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 271(a) (2012). These patent exclusivities can be worth
billions of dollars. See, e.g., Christopher Yasiejko & Susan Decker, Merck Wins Record
$2.5 Billion Patent Verdict Against Gilead, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:30 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-15/gilead-told-to-pay-merck-254-billion-in-hepatitis-c-royalties (reporting that a jury awarded Merck & Co. $2.5
billion, which is the equivalent of ten percent royalties, based on Gilead Science’s use
of its patented drug compound to treat hepatitis C).

ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

920

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/13/2017 6:37 PM

[Vol. 66:911

biological compounds in conjunction with manufacturing processes that
are ripe for patenting. Thus, innovators can earn statutory exclusivity
for biologics testing data for twelve to twelve and a half years as well as
patent portfolio rights (i.e., active patent life) for the biological
compound and/or manufacturing process coextensively, where patent
protection may extend five to eleven months longer.26 Still, with
biologics development times generally running longer than those of
traditional single-molecule drugs, the data exclusivity will oftentimes
exceed patent exclusivity for the innovative new chemical entity or
process of which the manufacturer received patent protection.
To advance biologics manufacturing processes at a rate consistent
with rapid scientific development, legislation must encourage
biologics manufacturers, in the form of biologics licenses and patent
rights, to pursue regulatory approval more often. These more
frequent quid pro quo disclosure opportunities—supported by showing
improvement to societal health—should change current regime
trends: innovator biologics companies should disclose scientific
knowledge about their biologics manufacturing processes more
frequently than once at the beginning of their twelve-year market
exclusivity period or (generally) twenty-year patent grant unless the
societal health improvement is so substantial that a four-year data
exclusivity and twelve-year market exclusivity period is justified. As
biologic originators’ exclusivity periods expire, biosimilars (and in
the future, interchangeables) manufacturers similarly disclose bare
minimum manufacturing process knowledge, as they rely on safety
and effectiveness clinical-trial data from the RPS.27 By legislatively
creating a tiered data exclusivity system within 42 U.S.C.
§ 262(k)(7)(B), whereby the Secretary accepts an additional data
exclusivity application from the originator prior to the expiration of
their previously granted data exclusivity period, biologic
manufacturing process knowledge will grow alongside scientific
development; for both the original data exclusivity grant and
26. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7); Heled, supra note 23, at 423–24. Professor Yaniv
Heled provides a compelling case study and graphical depiction, illustrating when
initial research and development on a biologics begins, demonstrating how typical
patent terms and exclusivity periods overlap. Id. at 449.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2) (detailing the requirements to apply for licensure of
biological products as a biosimilar); Gaudry, supra note 22, at 587, 592. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 262(k)(2) (relying on safety and effectiveness data for large-molecule
biopharmaceutical drugs), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (relying on safety and effectiveness
data for small-molecule chemical drugs).
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subsequent data exclusivity application, the Secretary will
determine—on a case-by-case basis—the appropriate one- to four-year
data exclusivity period. Ideally, the inefficiencies that plague smallmolecule originator and generics manufacturers will be minimized in
the biologics and FOB manufacturing environment as more
information is released in stages.
Disclosing scientific advances has obvious pros and cons,28 but the
ultimate question is whether the innovator feels he can obtain an ROI
by capturing market share to set up prospective growth.29 When
comparing a brand-name or generic small-molecule applicant with a
biologics or biosimilar applicant, respectively, given the high rate of
failure, there must be a significantly larger ROI than the “300 billion
[dollars that was spent] on research and development (R&D) with
such little improvement over the last twenty years in the life expectancy
of patients.”30
Currently, biopharma has the highest rate of
reinvestment in R&D of any U.S. industry—approximately nineteen
percent.31 If product sponsors and manufacturers lower or reallocate
28. Manufacturing process transparency will allow firms to easily police
manufacturing patents, which would in turn provide greater incentives to innovate.
Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 343, 354.
29. Potentially creating independent pathways to validate new technologies
outside of the new drug application (NDA) and BLA process or creating new
disclosure opportunities for biologics manufacturers would provide ROI viability
options. Id. at 353 (suggesting that establishing a market for innovative drug
manufacturing technologies would provide additional disclosure incentives and
economically enticing licensing schemes).
30. On Assignment: Hacking Cancer, supra note 21 (quote appears at 7:39 in
video); see also Els Torreele, Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Encourage
Innovation?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405
2970204542404577156993191655000 (showing that patent duration and scope have
increased, and research-and-development spending has increased yet “new molecular
entitles” have decreased forty-five percent since the late 1990s).
31. JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, HIGH VALUE, HIGH UNCERTAINTY: MEASURING RISK IN
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH
AND
OTHER
INDUSTRIES
12
(2014)
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Life-Science
s-Health-Care/gx-lshc-measuring-risk-in-biopharmaceutical-research.pdf;
see
also
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2015 PROFILE: BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH
INDUSTRY 25 (2015), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_ph
rma_profile.pdf (explaining that biopharma invests “more than 13 times the amount
of R&D per employee than manufacturing industries overall”); Michael Casey &
Robert Hackett, The 10 Biggest R&D Spenders Worldwide, FORTUNE (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:45
AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/17/top-10-research-development (illustrating
that two industries—health care and computers—account for half of all R&D
investment); Innovation Saves, supra note 14 (describing the results of such heavy
investment in R&D).
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reinvestments toward R&D, inefficiencies will continue to plague the
biopharmaceutical manufacturing process. High-quality innovation,
on the other hand, utilizes an originator’s scientific expertise to focus
investments on manufacturing “drift” and inefficiency to ultimately
create a more valuable consumer product. Biologics manufacturing
processes and their associated analytical tools are the backbone of
innovation in the biological products market. Because precision
medications and rare disease treatments require high initial
investment and occasionally expensive companion genetic testing,
neither being properly incentivized within the BPCIA, the biological
products landscape is poised for change.
A. Defining Biological Products
Biological products32 are at the forefront of biomedical research and
are complex mixtures not easily identified or characterized.33 The
FDA defines biological drugs as agents containing over forty amino
acids manufactured in vivo—typically through recombinant DNA
technology.34 Therefore, biologics are isolated from natural sources.35
In time, biologics—coming from living precursors—may offer the most
effective means to treat complex medical illnesses and conditions.36
Their curative media include gene therapy, regenerative medicine,
enzyme replacement,37 immune-oncology, precision medicine,

32. A biological product is defined as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin,
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product,
protein . . . or analogous product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure
of a disease or condition of human beings.” 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1).
33. W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1769, 1769 (2016)
[hereinafter Price, Regulating Secrecy] (“Biologics, which comprise the most innovate
and expensive drugs today, are the path-dependent result of complex, secret
manufacturing processes.”).
34. Lynne A. Bui et al., Key Considerations in the Preclinical Development of
Biosimilars, DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY SUPPLEMENT, May 2015, at 3, 4.
35. Biologics “are produced and purified from living systems such as bacteria,
yeast or mammalian cell lines.” Id. at 3.
36. Bradford R. Hirsch & Gary H. Lyman, Biosimilars: A Cure to the U.S. Health
Care Cost Conundrum?, 28 BLOOD REVIEWS 263, 263 (2014); see also V. Strand & B.
Cronstein, Biosimilars: How Similar?, 44 INTERNAL MEDICINE J. 218, 218 (2014) (stating
that monoclonal antibodies, soluble receptors, cell surface antigens, and costimulation signals represent the “most complicated” of biologic agents).
37. The most common manner for production of therapeutic proteins is
generally recombinant proteins produced by host cells. Florian M. Wurm, Production
of Recombinant Protein Therapeutics in Cultivated Mammalian Cells, 22 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1393 (2004), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v22/n11/full/
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vaccines, and other agents critical for maintenance of disease states
including cancer and autoimmune diseases.38
Because biologics are made from living organisms, the functional-,
safety-, and efficacy-related properties of a biologic depend heavily on
their manufacturing and processing conditions.39 A difference of one
degree in manufacturing can lead to denatured proteins and
ineffective treatments.
While biologics can harness the
therapeutically useful aspects of naturally-occurring cellular
responses, their manufacturability and batch-to-batch drift require a
more complex and supervised examination.
This process is
incredibly sensitive; small changes in extra-cellular matrix pressure,
temperature,
solubility,
etc.
undoubtedly
affect
cellular
communications, rendering a biologic useless (and potentially
dangerous) or efficacious.40
While manufacturing processes attempt to mimic in vivo extra-cellular
matrices, product variability with each subsequent batch is inevitable.
Difficulties in classifying the proteins within a biologic and non-precise
manufacturing processes mean that clinical assessments must approve of
a process based on its precision41 rather than its accuracy.42
nbt1026.html.
38. Innovation Saves, supra note 14; see also Charles L Bennet et al., Regulatory and
Clinical Considerations for Biosimilar Oncology Drugs, 15 LANCET ONCOLOGY 594, 594
(2014); Farah Huzair & Dinar Kale, Biosimilars and the Long Game, 33 TRENDS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 250, 250 (2015); Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 905; Adam Ross
& Kelly Richard, Biosimilars, 79 CONN. MED. 295, 295 (2015).
39. Bui et al., supra note 34, at 4 (“[B]iologics are proteins that are typically
much larger than chemically synthesized small-molecule drugs, exhibit a high degree
of structural complexity, including primary, secondary, tertiary and possibly
quaternary structures, and are subject to post-translational modifications.”); see also
Darren S. Tucker & Gregory F. Wells, Emerging Competition Issues Involving Follow-on
Biologics, ANTITRUST, Fall 2014, at 100, 100 (noting that changing the manufacturing
process could modify the product in ways that might not be detected, yet may alter
safety or efficacy). For an overview of the small-molecule drug versus large-molecule
biologic divide, and how their characteristics and manufacturing conditions are
inherently considered and contrasted in both the BPCIA and Hatch-Waxman Act,
see generally Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (a Lack of) Science: Limitations in Determining
Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-on Biologics and Barriers to Their Approval and
Commercialization, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9.
40. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 599 (stating that changing immunogenicity
profiles can be due to cell lines or media components, structural modifications,
protein aggregation, suboptimum storage processes, and patient factors).
41. Precision refers to the closeness of two or more measurements to each other.
Precision medicine and precision drug manufacturing go hand-in-hand. “We are
entering an era of precision medicine, when drugs must be made with unique
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Originator biologics and biosimilar pharmaceuticals will inevitably
gain market share. However, if manufacturers continue to use the
same manufacturing process for up to twelve and a half years of
market exclusivity or twenty years from filing a patent application, the
same drug shortage, recall, and overall inefficiency issues that plague
the small-molecule pharmaceutical industry will consume the
growing biopharmaceutical industry.43
B. Biosimilars’ Movement into the Market Place
“Biosimilar”44 is a term used to describe an FOB drug whose target is
the same as that of the originator biologic, similar to the relationship
between generics and brand name pharmaceuticals.45 Biosimilars are
functional equivalents of an originator biologic and require less
clinical trial data for approval.46 As biologics’ patents and exclusivity
grants expire, biosimilars manufacturers have the opportunity to claim
alternative or more efficient methods of manufacture.

features” that are replicable by continuous manufacturing. Lawrence Yu, Continuous
Manufacturing Has a Strong Impact on Drug Quality, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.: FDA
VOICE (Apr. 12, 2016) http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2016/04/continuo
us-manufacturing-has-a-strong-impact-on-drug-quality.
42. Bui et al., supra note 34, at 3 (listing biosimilar development steps: (1)
“selection of an appropriate reference biologic,” (2) “understanding the key
molecular attributes of that reference biologic,” and (3) “development of a
manufacturing process to match these attributes of the reference biologic product”);
see also W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Are Trade Secrets Delaying Biosimilars?, 348
SCI. 188, 188 (2015). Accuracy measures how close a result (or process) tracks with
the true, pre-determined value. Accuracy ensures the repeatability of process
parameters—and therefore products—in biologics manufacturing. Jim Cahill,
Accurate and Repeatable Measurements in Pharmaceutical and Biotech Manufacturing,
EMERSON PROCESS MGMT. (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.emersonprocessxperts.com/2016
/03/accurate-and-repeatable-measurements-in-pharmaceutical-and-biotech-manufacturing.
43. For a complete list of FDA inspection citations, see Inspections Citations, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm346077.htm.
44. See McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 409 (explaining that changing
manufacturing processes, whether by scaling or by creating a biosimilar, will slightly
modify the structure and function of the resulting biomolecules, which is why these
products are referred to as “biosimilar,” rather than “biogeneric” or “bioidentical”).
45. Id. at 405 (noting that biosimilars must meet strict requirements of quality
and comparability to the originator biologic).
46. See Information for Industry (Biosimilars), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Developme
ntApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/Therape
uticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/ucm241720.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2017).
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Currently, the hallmark of the biologics market is high price.47
Biologics routinely cost consumers between $50,000 and $250,000 for
a single year of treatment.48 But as biological products come offpatent and their exclusivity periods expire, biosimilars will naturally
capture market share49 without the systemic patent-cliff issues50 posed
by the small-molecule generics market.51 Instead, the high cost of
manufacturing and ensuring quality control will limit generic
involvement regardless of patent protection, diminishing immediate
competition and creating market-driven barriers on entry.
Subsequent competition reinforces manufacturing efficiency and
minimizes new investors’ risk. Drugs represented ten to fourteen
percent of American health-care costs in 2015,52 and increased
competition threatened by and due to the biosimilars market offers
customer savings of at least eight to ten billion dollars a year.53

47. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 594 (“In 2016, half of the ten most expensive
pharmaceuticals will be biologicals.”).
48. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 100; see infra text accompanying note 76 (noting
that biologics may cost greater than twenty times more than a small-molecule drug).
49. See G. Dranitsaris et al., Clinical Trial Design in Biosimilar Drug Development, 31
INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS 479, 480–81 (2013) (noting that by 2017, $60 billion
worth of brand biologicals will be coming off patent protection in developed
countries); Roe, supra note 4, at S28 (suggesting that biosimilars are safe and
effective alternatives particularly because of the regulatory stringency around
development, manufacturing, and licensing); see also Strand & Cronstein, supra note
36, at 218–19 (discussing the interest in producing biosimilars to counteract the
“significant financial burden” of biologic therapies, which often limits their use to
patients in wealthier countries).
50. Patent cliff issues refer to the fact that there are less small-molecule blockbuster
drugs capable of being discovered, and as these drugs lose patent protection, market
prices and incentives to innovate will drastically change. See generally Chie Hoon Song
& Jeung-Whan Han, Patent Cliff and Strategic Switch: Exploring Strategic Design Possibilities
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 SPRINGERPLUS 692 (2016).
51. Erwin A Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., Biologics & Biosimilars: The Possibility
of Encouraging Innovation and Competition, SCITECH LAW., Spring 2015, at 4, 5–6;
Huzair & Kale, supra note 38, at 252.
52. Affordable, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., http://innovationsaves.life/
affordable (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
53. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 589. “We predict that biosimilars will lead to a $44.2
billion reduction in direct spending on biologic drugs from 2014 to 2024, or about 4
percent of total biologic spending over the same period, with a range of $13 billion to $66
billion.” ANDREW W. MULCAHY ET AL., RAND CORP., THE COST SAVINGS POTENTIAL OF
BIOSIMILAR DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE127/RAND_PE127.pdf.
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Besides having similar molecular shape, efficacy, and safety to
biologics,54 biosimilars will by nature provide lower cost-alternatives.
Lower regulatory and financial barriers offer biologics manufacturers
with more incentives to disclose manufacturing information in return
for patent protection and exclusivity rights. The biosimilar market
discount versus the cost of originator biologics will be between twenty
and forty percent for consumers, while historically the small-molecule
generics market discount was around eighty percent in comparison to
brand-name small-molecule pharmaceuticals.55 Because the market
for oncology biologicals alone is over $100 billion, the innovation of
originator biologics and biosimilars provide significant opportunity to
pass savings on to consumers.56
C. Inherent Scientific Development Differences Between Small-Molecule and
Large-Molecule Pharmaceutical Compounds
Research and development of biological therapies proliferated in
response to inefficiencies in production and therapeutic precision
within the small-molecule generics market.57 Generics make up over
eighty percent of filled prescriptions in the United States, illustrating
market saturation and a fast eroding market for small-molecule

54. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 594.
55. Id. at 596; Hirsch & Lyman, supra note 36, at 264, 267; Steven D. Lucio et al.,
Biosimilars: Implications for Health-System Pharmacists, 70 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY
2004, 2008, 2011–12 (2013).
56. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 594; Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note
8, at 344 (emphasizing that reducing excessive manufacturing costs could generate
tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in consumer savings). Manufacturing costs are
either the first or second highest expense for sponsor drug firms. Id. “The
successful integration and uptake of biosimilars in oncology may help to expand
choices for clinicians and patients and increase accessibility to potentially beneficial
treatments.” Katherine H. Rak Tkaczuk & Ira Allen Jacobs, Biosimilars in Oncology:
From Development to Clinical Practice, 41 SEMINARS ONCOLOGY 3, 11 (2014) (reporting
that a study of 118 community-based oncologists found that nearly sixty percent now
consider drug costs in clinical decision making, “roughly half reported the need to
change treatment plans due to the loss of medical insurance, and 58% reported that
patients refused treatment due to the financial concerns”).
57. See Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 479 (describing the shift toward the
development of biologics during the past two decades); Edward C. Li et al.,
Considerations in the Early Development of Biosimilar Products, DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY,
May 2015, at 1 (noting that as the biologics market grows, changes in pharmaceutical
product development will lead to more biosimilars as well).
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drugs.58 In contrast to large molecule biosimilars, current regulation
requires that small-molecule generics be the “bioequivalent” of its
corresponding brand drug.59 A bioequivalence standard, requiring a
well-controlled and “well-defined chemical structure and
physiochemical properties,”60 illustrates the scientific community’s
acceptance of easily classifying and replicating small-molecule
reactions. These manufacturing processes are relatively easy to
replicate and set consistent standards for a quality product.61
On the other hand, biologics have much larger molecular sizes and
structures,62 consequently creating more uncertainty and difficulty in
Critical to safety and efficacy of
product standardization.63
biosimilars are studies of stability, pharmacokinetics, and

58. See Peter Wehrwein, A Conversation with Steve Miller, MD: Come in and Talk with
Us, Pharma, MANAGED CARE (Apr. 2015), http://www.managedcaremag.com/linkout
/2015/4/27 (discussing how, by spurring innovation and lowering costs, pharmacy
benefit managers, such as ExpressScripts, influence market saturation and consumer
demand by acting as a medium that balances market disruption with savings, thereby
analyzing data and sifting through the biopharmaceutical market to determine where
consumer money is best spent); see also Simon King, The Best Selling Drugs of All Time;
Humira Joins the Elite, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2013, 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
simonking/2013/01/28/the-best-selling-drugs-of-all-time-humira-joins-the-elite
(illustrating biologic Humira’s ability to capture market share).
59. 21 C.F.R. § 320.33 (2016).
60. Preeta Kaur Chugh & Vandana Roy, Biosimilars: Current Scientific and
Regulatory Considerations, 9 CURRENT CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 53, 56 (2014).
61. Id. at 53; see also Thomas Reinke, Encouraging Guidance Released for Biosimilar
Manufacturers, MANAGED CARE (Aug. 2014), http://www.managedcaremag.com/link
out/2014/8/10 (stating that meeting well-defined bioequivalence or
interchangeable status implies greater market acceptance).
62. Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 479 (“[B]iological drugs are derived from
living organisms or their products. Biologicals are structurally more complex and
unique from chemically synthesized [small-molecule drugs] because of their larger
size and intricate manufacturing process. Secondary to their protein structure, they
are also more prone to acute and chronic immune responses.”). Typically,
biologicals are one hundred to one thousand times larger, “with amino acids joined
to form complex primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary structures, with post[]translational modifications.” Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 56.
63. Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 53, 56; Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra, note 33,
at 1793 (“[T]he secretive, idiosyncratic, and frequently stochastic way biologics are
made hampers the development of biosimilars.”); see Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note
51, at 5 (discussing the complexity of manufacturing biologics and the small margin
for error); see also Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 345 (noting that
biologicals manufacturing typically faces higher absolute costs than other drugs on
both a fixed and per-unit bases).
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pharmacological mechanisms.64 The manufacturing processes of
biosimilars create variability in structure and therefore cause
variability in immunological responses.65
Variability and these barriers to entry, however, are opportunities
for manufacturers to reach captive markets, which is exemplified by
the patent-trade secret trade-off scenario. There, the manufacturer
can either withhold information as trade secrets to prevent follow-on
manufacturers from reverse-engineering biologics or processes, or
the manufacturer can disclose critical aspects of the process in return
for patent exclusivity periods.66 Ultimately, the manufacturer wants
the patent and BLA/aBLA claims to be broad enough to protect
subsequent innovation, while narrow enough to prevent subsequent
biopharmaceutical manufacturers from reverse-engineering and
pushing the biologic originator out of the market.67
D. Manufacturing Innovation: The Rate-Determining Step for Biologics
and Biosimilars Market Growth
Innovation requires sharing information among pioneers. In the
highly regulated drug industry, manufacturers are incentivized to
innovate when provided with reasonable investment-backed
expectations and compensation in return for information disclosure.
When biologics and biosimilars manufacturers are provided time and
incentive to analyze manufacturing “drift,”68 there will be more
efficient manufacturing methods, alternative therapeutic uses, and
innovative manufacturing processes, all of which will improve drug
safety, efficacy, and purity.69

64. Shein-Chung Chow et al., Scientific Considerations for Assessing Biosimilar
Products, 32 STAT. MED. 370, 371–72 (2013); see also Lucio et al., supra note 55, at
2010; Ross & Richard, supra note 38, at 297.
65. Chow et al., supra note 64, at 375–76; Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 56
(describing how differences in manufacturing can involve structural changes in
extraction, purification processes, three-dimensional environmental structure,
quantity of acid-base variants, and the glycosylation profile); see also Roe, supra note 4,
at S28 (reporting that immunogenicity and immune responses caused by these
structural changes during the manufacturing process are the primary safety concerns
of biosimilars prescribers).
66. See infra Part III.
67. Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 7; see infra Section II.A.
68. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 5–6 (defining “drift” as the
physiochemical variance of biologics characteristics over time).
69. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 407–08 (explaining that sponsors
routinely change manufacturing processes when scaling, improving efficacy, or
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The development and acceptance of biologics and biosimilars for
cancer therapies accentuates how precision medicines depend upon
a manufacturer’s incentive to innovate.70 As biologics develop,
cancer treatments will be tailored to each patient and target specific
characteristics of the tumor or tumor-causing agent, illustrating the
accurate and precise nature of biological therapies.71
Similarly, yet not ideally, biosimilars manufacturers first determine
and then compare quality target product profile (QTPP) parameters
to coincide with the RPS’s process.72 Biosimilar manufacturers
possess and use process “knowledge of cell expansion, filtration,
centrifugation, purification, product characterization, and . . .
product stability” to meet the FDA’s minimum safety and efficacy
standards.73
The strength of their process knowledge and
reassurance of quality, safety, and efficacy is then translated to
clinicians and physicians to ensure they are informed decision
makers before consulting with patients.74 Thus, the FDA can
indirectly control which biopharmaceuticals—and therefore the
extent of clinical trial data necessary—physicians and other healthcare providers prescribe and integrate into clinical practice.75
modernizing the process, thus providing an avenue to explore manufacturing
innovation).
70. Roe, supra note 4, at 28–29 (“[I]ncreased use of biosimilars may be seen as a
possible cost saving in the treatment of cancer, offering greater access to treatments
and providing the option for treatments to be introduced earlier.”); Wehrwein, supra
note 58 (concluding that more and more drug products overlap in indication,
including biosimilars, which will offer cheaper alternatives and quality care); see also
Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2006 (describing the complexities of manufacturing
processes including isolating a targeted gene, cloning and then expressing the
gene). Compare supra Section I.C (acknowledging that incentivizing biologics
variability assessments is dependent upon the target market), with Chugh & Roy,
supra note 60, at 56 (“Biologics with complex production processes and the resultant
heterogeneous compounds make it difficult to standardise the product,
manufacture, and ensure adequate activity, integrity, and quality.”). Idealistically,
biologics could become a single-treatment cure, whereby clinicians tell
manufacturers the exact indication or treatment required, and the manufacturer
adjusts process parameters to output the desired formulary.
71. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 3. For example, Trastuzumab, a biologic, is
the first targeted therapy for women with HER2 overexpressed breast cancer. Id. at 3–4.
72. Bui et al., supra note 34, at 7.
73. Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2006, 2009.
74. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 6.
75. Id. at 10; see David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal
Issues Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant ProteinBased Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 143–45 (2005)
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Customers and clinicians know a biologic typically costs at least
twenty times more than a small-molecule drug.76 What they don’t
know is how the market will respond to biologics—i.e., whether the
market will find them worth the cost—though clinical data should
point consumers in the right direction.
Biosimilars require analytical comparability,77 which must
demonstrate that the biosimilar is “highly similar” without having
“clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of the safety, purity,
and potency.”78 These statutory and FDA mandates result in
consumers and physicians receiving the critical data necessary for
acceptance and prescription of these medicines. The FDA must
therefore balance safety requirements and economic rationale for
drug development79 to ensure biosimilar manufacturers continue to
explore optimal process parameter designs.80 Enhanced safety and
comparability studies allow physicians to make informed policy
decisions about the administration of these new therapies;81 they also
require that the manufacturing process achieve a formulation

(discussing the history of biologics and recommending a regulatory framework for the
FDA to adopt regarding biologics under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
76. Ude Lu, Note, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a Delicate
Balance Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 633 (2014).
77. See Berlex Labs., Inc. v. FDA, 942 F. Supp. 19, 25–27 (D.D.C. 1996)
(upholding the FDA’s authority to use the comparability process, requiring
pharmacological and therapeutic equivalence).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A)–(B) (2012); see also Chow et al., supra note 64, at 374.
79. Hirsch & Lyman, supra note 36, at 265; see also W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn
Cohen, Nudging the FDA, AM. INT., Nov./Dec. 2014, at 35, 36 (highlighting the role of
the FDA “in balancing the safety of drugs against their potential” treatment use).
80. These design parameters are “goalposts” that a biologicals license candidate
uses to compare to the reference originator product. McCamish & Woollett, supra
note 4, at 410. Any parameter for the biosimilar outside of the goalpost must be
shown to have no clinically significant impact on the final product. Id.
81. Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 62 (“Evidence-based medicine and clinical
experience strongly influence a physician’s decision to prescribe a particular product.
Physician’s acceptance and subsequent prescribing of a new biosimilar product will
require adequate information and evidence ensuring efficacy and patient safety.”);
Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2007 (noting that because bioequivalence cannot be
established, health institutions and physicians will need to individually evaluate
biosimilars before prescribing them); see also Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 5
(stating that scientific societies must help evaluate biosimilar data while educating
healthcare providers and providing general consensus regarding effective therapeutic
uses); Roe, supra note 4, at 29 (maintaining that physicians act as advocates for patients
and will further support biosimilars in a clinical setting once biosimilar drug
mechanisms and differences in the side effect profiles are understood).
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containing the least amount of other chemicals.82 Ultimately, a
manufacturer’s goals must include a more quantitative, mechanismbased understanding, and an ability to predict human health, disease,
and intervention responses.83
However, scientific and legal restraints force manufacturers to
essentially construct manufacturing processes from scratch.84
Accordingly, there is significant risk with uncertain and
unquantifiable reward because the biosimilar manufacturing process
may fail to identically replicate an originator biologic, or it may
ideally produce enhanced process control and new therapeutic
uses.85
Nevertheless, rather than precise structure and
physiochemical characterization, biosimilarity subsequently turns into
a comparative analysis: assessing manufacturing process variability
and comparing product efficacy and safety between an innovator and
FOB by using QTPP parameters.86
II. FDA EXCLUSIVITY: TAKING ADVANTAGE OF AN EXECUTIVE
AGENCY’S SUPPLY OF DE FACTO MONOPOLIES
The BPCIA’s dual mission of promoting innovation and
accessibility of biologics creates unique opportunities for biologics
manufacturers. To promote innovation, the FDA grants market and
data exclusivity periods. Specifically, the twelve-year market and fouryear data exclusivity periods for originator biologics prevent
biosimilars or interchangeables from being approved.87 One of the
most effective opportunities innovators utilize is the FDA data
exclusivity grant. While market exclusivity means “simply having no
competition for a product in the marketplace,” data exclusivity refers
to protection of the drug and original clinical trial data, preventing
manufacturers from supporting approval of their biosimilar.88 Only a

82. Dudzinski, supra note 75, at 232.
83. Woodcock, supra note 13, at 152; see infra Section IV.C.2 (arguing that,
because they possess first-hand process knowledge, originators are best capable of
analyzing and predicting societal health improvements from current and enhanced
manufacturing capabilities).
84. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 350.
85. Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 5.
86. Chow et al., supra note 64, at 380.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A)–(B) (2012); Lu, supra note 76, at 613–14.
88. Jonathan Stroud, Comment, The Illusion of Interchangeability: The Benefits and
Dangers of Guidance-Plus Rulemaking in the FDA’s Biosimilar Approval Process, 63 ADMIN.
L. REV. 599, 602 nn.13–14 (2011).
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biologic with a structural modification resulting in a change in safety,
purity, or potency is eligible for data exclusivity.89 But once the fouryear data exclusivity grant elapses, the FDA starts accepting aBLAs.90
These applicants piggy-back off of the approved originator’s clinical
trials in anticipation of the market exclusivity term expiration.91
FDA exclusivity grants provide unique and potentially stronger
protection than patent exclusivity for four reasons: (1) novel
biologic’s composition classifications inherently cover a larger scope
than a single patent; (2) currently, twelve years of exclusivity likely
meets or slightly surpasses the life of the biologic’s active composition
patent;92 (3) FDA exclusivity is independent from, and in addition to,
claims for patent exclusivity; and (4) FDA exclusivity inherently
inhibits reverse-engineering and designing-around.93 The advantages
of these FDA exclusivity grants in light of their disclosure
requirements are examined below with respect to originator biologics
and FOB manufacturing processes.
A. Obligations for Biological Products Market Entry
Before a manufacturer may introduce a biological product into
interstate commerce, it must receive a biologics license authorized
under the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”).94 Before 2010, the FDA
granted biologics licenses only under section 351(a) of the PHSA for
pioneers (i.e. innovators) and for select products and hormones under
section 505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).95
In 2010, the BPCIA implemented a balance between societal health
implications and incentivizing market growth through both increased

89. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc) (2012).
90. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY FOR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS FILED UNDER SECTION
351(A) OF THE PHS ACT 1 (Aug. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guida
ncecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm407844.pdf.
91. Id. at 2–3.
92. As prior art and manufacturing methodology improves, process innovations
are likely to require less testing and validation; thus, patents can be applied for
earlier in the biologics development life-cycle, and exclusivities are thereby likely to
extend past patent protection.
93. Lu, supra note 76, at 623–24.
94. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300; Richard A. Epstein, The
Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 285 (2011).
95. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99; Epstein, supra note 94, at
285, 294; see supra note 39.
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consumer access and incentivized innovation. The BPCIA revised
section 351(a) to create a stand-alone pathway for abbreviated
applications under section 351(k) of the PHSA.96 With the change,
the FOB applicant must show that “the biological product . . . is safe,
pure, and potent.”97 However, the safety, purity, and potency is
controlled directly by the biological product’s manufacturing process.
Thus, “the facility in which the biological product is manufactured,
processed, packed, or held [must meet] standards designed to assure
that the biological product continues to be safe, pure, and potent.”98
The BPCIA (1) established standards for application and
approval,99 (2) provided a term of data exclusivity,100 and (3)
established a scheme for handling patent disputes.101 However, the
BPCIA imposes a new disclosure requirement for license holders and
imposes requirements on both pioneer biologic and biosimilar
manufacturers:102
for instance, it requires pioneer biologic
manufacturers to provide applicants with a list of patents it believes
“could reasonably be asserted” as infringed with respect to the
pioneer product.103 The BPCIA requires this exchange to be in good

96. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k); Epstein, supra note 94, at 286. The BPCIA stipulates that
a manufacture may not apply for a biosimilars license until four years after—and the
biosimilar cannot be approved until twelve years after—the reference biologic is
approved. Strand & Cronstein, supra note 36, at 220.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I).
98. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(II).
99. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 5 (arguing that the goal of biosimilar
development should be to show sufficient similarity in composition, biological
activity, and pharmacokinetics to allow existing efficacy and safety data to be used,
thus resulting in a more efficient development and approval process).
100. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 408 (highlighting the twelve year
period of exclusivity for innovator biologics provided by the BPCIA).
101. § 262(l)(1)(F).
102. Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 60–61 (noting that the aBLA for highly
similar biological products requires a demonstration of the same “mechanism of
action, route of administration, dosage form, and potency” compared to the
innovator product); Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101 (listing the steps at which a
pioneer must share information with a follow-on manufacturer, including: follow-on
application disclosure, first pioneer response, follow-on response, second pioneer
response, negotiations and initial litigations, and notice of commercial marketing).
103. § 262(l)(3)(A)(i) (requiring the RPS, no later than sixty days after receiving
applicants information, to provide “a list of patents for which the reference product
sponsor believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted by the
reference product sponsor”); see also § 262(l)(3)(B) (providing that the applicant
may proactively provide the RPS with “a list of patents to which the subsection (k)
applicant believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” but
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faith so that the applicant and RPS agree on which patents will be the
subject of any infringement action.104 This is a critical step in process
protection for the manufacturer: it must decide whether trade
secrecy or patentability provides the best value for protection.105
Because confidential manufacturing information would be provided
by the applicant to the RPS,106 both the RPS and the FOB applicant
must determine the value of their manufacturing processes (and
clinical trials) prior to any exclusivity grant expiration. Additional
considerations relevant to the approval process for biologics and FOB
include “the timing of application submission and the duration of
market exclusivity for originator reference products”;107 furthermore,
the BPCIA does not operate retroactively with respect to any data
submitted prior to its enactment.108

must provide a statement regarding why the applicant believes the patent is invalid,
unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the biological).
Patents provide a piece-meal description, like pieces of a puzzle, toward a
determination of infringement. Only the potential infringer knows what the whole
puzzle looks like, and the challenging party must analyze each piece to determine
whether it fits within this puzzle or whether it is part of a puzzle of its own.
Essentially, real-time analysis of the process is required for this determination,
exemplified by the fact that science currently cannot classify, with sufficient
particularity, all attributes and structures of a biologic. See Robin Feldman & W.
Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio and Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 773, 803 (2014) (discussing the difficulty in assessing patent
infringement because of the propensity for trade secrecy). But see W. Nicholson
Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs:
Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 526–27, 555 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Making Do
in Making Drugs] (describing the statutory rebuttable presumption of infringement
in favor of the patent holder, if the plaintiff shows “(1) that a substantial likelihood
exists that the product was made by the patented process, and (2) that the plaintiff
made a reasonable effort to determine the process actually used in the production of
the product and was unable to so determine” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 295)).
Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. § 271 provides a safe harbor of sorts, stating indirectly that
there is no patent infringement for using a product from a patented manufacturing
process for the development of a related biologic, which enables the generic to be
placed on the market as soon as the patent expires. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
104. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 7002(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010). However, if there is no agreement between
parties as to which patents shall be the subject of an infringement action, the RPS may
not exceed the number of patents listed by the applicant. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5).
105. See infra Section III.B.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(l)–(2); see infra text accompanying note 122.
107. Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2008.
108. Epstein, supra note 94, at 304.
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Exclusivity periods balance the interests of the patent holder with
societal access and health implications. They provide valuable time for
the patent holder to assess a biopharmaceutical’s price necessary for
recovering its initial investment.109 Indirectly, they accelerate the
competition’s entry into the biological market110—with procedures by
which manufacturers can formally resolve patent negotiations111—and
provide time for the RPS to identify areas of improvement for potential
patent extensions.112 During the data exclusivity period, the FDA
cannot approve a similar or identical drug formulation that relies on
the RPS’s data.113 However, the data exclusivity period does not
preclude FOB sponsors from conducting independent research and
clinical trials. Effectively similar to the exclusionary right in patent law,
data exclusivity blocks competition and creates artificial scarcity.114
Lastly, the RPS may be eligible for an additional subsequent data
exclusivity period if an existing product is altered such that it
becomes “new” and has the ability to improve disease treatment.115
Three primary authors of the BPCIA encouraged a liberal stance
regarding what constitutes a “new” product, and if that position is
adopted, structural changes would be considered “new” and
therefore rewarded exclusivity periods in the future.116
B. Regulatory Threshold Standards for Approval of a Follow-on Biologics
Generic products, and specifically biosimilars, can substantially
reduce the costs for patients and taxpayers.117 These cost reductions
primarily stem from piggy-backing upon RPS’s clinical trials and data.
Using current analytical techniques, biosimilar manufacturers must
compare the safety and efficacy impact of the innovator product to
the reference biological product, instead of assessing how process

109. Id. at 286; see also Price & Cohen, supra, note 79, at 35 (“[The FDA] also
controls the accelerator and brake pedals on drug development and innovation
through its control of market exclusivity for approved new drugs.”).
110. Epstein, supra note 94, at 286.
111. Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2008.
112. See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 6; Bui et al., supra note 34, at 8–9.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A); see Gaudry, supra note 22, at 592.
114. Sorscher, supra note 17, at 294.
115. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 594.
116. Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo, Rep. Jay Inslee, and Rep. Joe Barton to
Food and Drug Administration (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.hpm.com/pdf/EIB%20
Ltr%20FDA%20DEC%202010.pdf.
117. See Stroud, supra note 88, at 605.
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changes correlate to the final product.118 FOB applicants must
demonstrate four criteria: (1) FOB and reference biologic product
are biosimilar; (2) FOB and reference biologic product employ the
same mechanism of action for the applicable condition; (3) FOB and
reference biologic product share the same conditions of use, route of
administration, dosage form, and strength; and (4) the facility in
which the FOB is manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets
safety, purity, and potency standards.119 If sameness is proven,
additional clinical trials for safety would not be needed; additionally,
historical human use provides evidence of safety.120
Follow-on biologics capitalize on the abbreviated approval pathway
for both biosimilars and interchangeable biological products.121
Originator biological product applicants must show “the FDA that its
process reliably produces a pure and therapeutically effective
biologic; to the extent that the process defines the product, [it] must
fully lay out its process to assist the FDA to understand the product
seeking approval.”122
Biosimilars require a demonstration of
comparability while small-molecule generics require a demonstration
of bioequivalence.123 Biocomparability or biosimilarity is derived
118. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1796. Comparative analytical
characterization may lead to one of four assessments within the development-phase
continuum:
(1) not similar, illustrating differences in results of analytical
characterization leading to further development through 351(k) not being
recommended; (2) similar, illustrating further information needed to determine
whether differences are within acceptable range to consider proposed biosimilar
product to be highly similar; (3) highly similar, illustrating proposed biosimilar
meets the statutory standard for analytical similarity, with residual uncertainty
capable of being resolved with targeted and selective animal and/or clinical studies;
and (4) highly similar with fingerprint-like similarity, illustrating the proposed
biosimilar meets statutory standards for analytical similarity based on a high level of
confidence and analytical similarity, with residual uncertainty capable of being
resolved with targeted and selective animal and/or clinical studies. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY DATA TO SUPPORT A
DEMONSTRATION OF BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 5–6 (Dec. 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm397017.pdf.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also Gaudry, supra note 22, at 596
(describing the requirements for FOB applications).
120. § 262(k)(4).
121. § 262(i)(2)(B), (k)(2).
122. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1803.
123. Li et al., supra note 57, at 3; see McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 409
(correlating attributes of the product to safety, purity, and potency for the United
States, and quality, safety, and efficacy for Europe). Thus, the development of
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from analytical studies (establishing similarity), as well as animal
studies (assessing toxicity) and clinical studies (assessing
immunogenicity and pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics) to
determine if a biologic is safe and effective.124
Interchangeable biologics on the other hand, require more
extensive
showings
but
provide
additional
incentives.
Interchangeable biologics (1) must meet the standards for
biosimilarity, (2) should “produce the same clinical result as the
reference product in any given patient,” and (3) can be switched
between the FOB and originator without presenting any ancillary
safety or efficacy risks.125 If the FOB is deemed interchangeable with
the reference product, a pharmacist may automatically substitute or
propose substitution without intervention from the prescribing
health-care provider.126 Important to prescribing physicians and
pharmacists is that there are no additional safety or efficacy risks
when switching between the original and interchangeable biological
product; however, these risk examinations require additional
studies—with, at best, potential exclusivity advantages.127 Due to the
current scientific state of biologics design and manufacturing,128 the
FDA has not approved any interchangeable biologics product, and
applicants are more likely to seek biosimilar approval prior to seeking

biosimilars requires iterative manufacturing process developments using elements of
quality by design to produce the QTPP of the reference biologic. Bui et al., supra
note 34, at 9.
124. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 598.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A)(ii); see also § 262(i)(2)(B), (i)(3); Ross & Richard,
supra note 38, at 296; Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 100. “Interchangeability is
important because it provides for a period of market exclusivity as well as for
automatic substitution of the interchangeable for the approved biologic without
intervention from the prescribing physician.” Patricia Fitzpatrick Dimond, FDA
Releases Biosimilars Guidelines to Little Fanfare, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2102), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/fda-releasesbiosimilars-guidelines-to-little-fanfare/4035. However, the FDA has acknowledged that
it is scientifically difficult to currently meet interchangeable data requirements. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3).
127. The standards for interchangeability are higher than biosimilarity because an
interchangeable biologic can be substituted with the reference product without
acknowledgement by a healthcare provider. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 7;
Reinke, supra note 61.
128. Price & Rai, supra note 42, at 188 (“[F]undamental knowledge has not
advanced to the point where product characteristics can fully be identified and
characterized through analysis of the final product.”).
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approval for an interchangeable biological product.129 The Federal
Trade Commission estimates that development of an FOB would take
between eight and ten years and cost $100 to $200 million; and,
because these FOBs will primarily be biosimilars, sponsors will miss
out on first interchangeable FOB exclusivity periods.130
With the enactment of the BPCIA, originator and innovator
biologics manufacturers are incentivized to invest in long-term
biological manufacturing process improvements.131 “[B]iosimilars . . .
can make the same headroom that generics made in the past”132
without the patent cliff fear that plagued the generics market,
providing an additional incentive to enter the biosimilars market.
The FOB applicant can submit its aBLA four years after the reference
129. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 411 (“Although an initial application
in the United States for a biosimilar can be for an interchangeable product, it is
expected that most sponsors will seek to establish biosimilarity first and then
supplement their dossier with additional data to support interchangeability.”);
Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 8 (“Interchangeability therefore requires an
expectation that the safety and efficacy risk is not greater than the reference product
not only in the population but at the individual patient level, and this is, necessarily,
a very high standard that may be difficult to establish on a scientific basis.”); see also
Stroud, supra note 88, at 626 (noting that higher interchangeability standards may
mean the costs do not outweigh the benefits of generic status).
130. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC
DRUG COMPETITION iii, 10 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologics
report.pdf; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262. Currently, investments pursuing interchangeability
are not fiscally justified due to the scientific state of biologics comparability, and the
uncertainty of physician—as well as consumer—acceptance of biologics.
131. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 7 (Apr. 2015) [hereinafter
HHS, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidanc
eComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291128.pdf
(encouraging
biosimilar sponsors to use a “stepwise approach” in developing and testing a
biosimilar); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS
IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY OF A THERAPEUTIC PROTEIN PRODUCT TO A REFERENCE
PRODUCT 10–16 (Apr. 2015) [hereinafter HHS, QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS],
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/UCM291134.pdf (discussing factors sponsors should consider during
the development and testing of a biosimilar); Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 62
(concluding that biologics’ complexity requires “ongoing risk-benefit assessment and
effective post-marketing pharmacovigilance to ensure product safety and efficacy”);
Huzair & Kale, supra note 38, at 251.
132. Wehrwein, supra note 58. The biosimilar class is a much more attractive
investment, so headroom must be made in the form of long-term value as opposed to
short-term price differential. See Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (comparing
the twenty-five percent to the seventy-to-ninety percent price erosion of biosimilars
versus small molecule generics).
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biological product is licensed.133 Thus, the FOB has ample time—
eight years after the expiration of the four-year data exclusivity
period—to obtain product approval prior to the expiration of the
RPS’s market exclusivity period.
FOB applicants have been hesitant to use the biosimilars application
process, as they continue to encounter significant risks and barriers to
entry. The aBLA for “highly similar” biological products follows the
pathway outlined by section 351(k) of PHSA.134 Examiners use a
“totality-of-the-evidence” approach to evaluate the biologics
application.135 However, these requirements do not sufficiently assist
physician decision-making processes, prompting applicants to pushback.136 Notably, the first aBLA was not approved until 2015.137
The design of the clinical trial is the most important aspect for
approval of the aBLA138 and uses a step-wise approach139 for assessing
trial progress.140 Conducting clinical trials amount to about half of
drug approval costs.141 The step-wise approach also allows investors to
make critical investment decisions along the way to assess and add
value to the biosimilarity determination.142 However, a sentiment

133. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k); HHS, QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 131, at 1;
HHS, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 131, at 9.
135. Chow et al., supra note 64, at 362; Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2009.
136. For examples of the lack of confidence in gaining product approval and in
the requirements for approval, see Anna Rose Welch, Are Emerging U.S. Biosimilar
Policies at Risk of Alienating Physicians?, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Apr. 5, 2016),
http://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/are-emerging-u-s-biosimilar-policies-atrisk-of-alienating-physicians-0001; Anna Rose Welch, How to Approach U.S. Physicians
DEV.
(Nov.
21,
2016),
About
Biosimilars,
BIOSIMILAR
http://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/how-to-approach-u-s-physicians-aboutbiosimilars-0001.
137. Janet Woodcock, Biosimilar Implementation: A Progress Report from FDA, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm463036.htm.
138. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 412 (discussing that the sponsor of a
biosimilar must have a thorough understanding of how to characterize the originator
product so suitable tests are used and the clinical trials are designed effectively).
139. Li et al., supra note 57, at 3 (intending biosimilarity analysis to be productspecific, “with each step serving to resolve as much remaining uncertainty as possible”).
140. “Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) remain the gold standard for assessing
the efficacy and safety of new drugs.” Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 481; see also
Strand & Cronstein, supra note 36, at 220 (indicating that the FDA uses a stepwise,
risk-based approach to determine the extent of residual uncertainty that should be
addressed by more animal and clinical studies).
141. Sorscher, supra note 17, at 293–94.
142. Li et al., supra note 57, at 7.
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many applicants likely agree with, is that the FDA must expand the
role of clinical pharmacology studies.143 In other words, the burden
on the FOB applicant remains too high, and the FDA should
consider data directly impacting patients as opposed to theoretical
pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics studies.144
After a “patent dance,”145 the approval process concludes with the
originator’s reference biological product scope and the innovator’s
FOB application.146 During the dance, the applicant clearly has the
higher degree of risk: the data exclusivity period has elapsed and the
market exclusivity period of the RPS has already been granted. Pfizer
Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.147 illustrates that the generic drug
manufacturer “must walk a fine line” by achieving similarity but
avoiding patent infringement.148 Thus, the applicant must make a risky

143. The FDA has broad discretion inherently built into a “highly similar”
determination that could allow it to give more weight to these studies. See Stroud,
supra note 88, at 625 (providing an example of how permissive the FDA may be:
“[t]he FDA can waive toxicity or certain Phase II and Phase III trials upon a ‘good
enough’ showing of chemical similarity”).
144. Reinke, supra note 61.
145. The patent dance is a procedure, after the biosimilar application has been
submitted to the FDA, where the applicant and RPS resolve patent disputes. Louis E.
Fogel & Peter H. Hanna, The Biosimilar Regulatory Pathway and the Patent Dance, JENNER
& BLOCK (Dec. 2014) https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/13837/origin
al/The_Biosimilar_Regulatory_Pathway_and_the_Patent_Dance.pdf (noting that the
patent dance involves strictly timed and sequential rounds of exchanging
information); see also Jeff Overley, Biosimilar Notice Always Mandatory, Fed. Circ. Rules,
LAW360 (July 5, 2016, 1:05 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/792580/biosimilar
-notice-always-mandatory-fed-circ-rules (explaining that the exchanging of
intellectual property information is meant to streamline patent litigation). The
Federal Circuit ruled that a 180-day notice provision in the BPCIA is required even if
the biosimilar makers participate in the patent dance. Id. Because the 180 days’
notice is required following FDA approval, reference product sponsors are provided
time to prepare a motion for preliminary injunction and have it decided prior to the
biosimilar’s product launch. Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1066 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-332, 2016 WL 4944497 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016); Robert E.
Colletti & Daniel G. Worley, Sandoz Requests U.S. Supreme Court Interpretation of the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., FROMMER
LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/insights/Detail.aspx
?news=31436f18-c433-4829-abee-cbc28b937129&.
146. In Sandoz v. Amgen, a biosimilar maker could not file a patent suit unless and
until the parties had danced the Patent Dance (a strict jurisdictional bar). 773 F.3d
1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
147. 359 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
148. Dudzinski, supra note 75, at 210. Norvasc attempted to rely on Pfizer’s data
to support FDA approval of its aNDA by arguing that an intermediate ingredient
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decision by determining what manufacturing process information to
patent and disclose and what information to conceal as a trade
secret.149 This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis
when analyzing exactly what the RPS has claimed and how the
innovator can subsequently penetrate the biopharmaceutical market.
III. PATENT EXCLUSIVITY: BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS AND THE RIGHT TO
EXCLUDE
Patent breadth and licensing opportunities help applicants navigate
the patent-trade secret scenario. If a patent is too broad, it may
accidentally or strategically cover claims an originator may not have
developed but were ripe for licensing.150 The interplay between
granted patents and applicant claims is exemplified in the blocking
patent scenario: two patents block each other when one patentee has
a broad patent on an invention and another has a narrower patent on
some improved feature of that invention. The broad patent dominates
the narrower one. In such a situation, the holder of the narrower
patent needs a license from the dominant patent holder to practice the
improved invention.151 The particular improved feature claimed in the
narrower patent, however, cannot be practiced by the dominant patent
holder without a license from the narrower patent holder.152
An invention or innovation is eligible for patenting after the
inventor produces a description that enables one skilled in the art to
practice the invention.153 Patents provide their own twenty-year
exclusivity periods.154 But, with respect to biologics manufacturing

(amlodipine maleate) fell outside the scope of Pfizer’s patent. Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1365,
1367 (holding that the extended period of a patent covers not only the active ingredient
in an approved drug but also intermediary ingredients that are critical to the process).
149. See infra Part IV.
150. However, this may raise enablement issues. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The
specification shall contain a written description . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use . . . the invention.”).
151. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 860–61.
152. Id. An owner of a patent with composition claims can assert the patent against an
inventor who makes the molecule by another process, even if the follow-on process is
much more efficient. Feldman & Price, supra note 103, at 791–92 (explaining that
inventing around a blocked technology in the biopharma industry requires high costs
due to the strength of the patents established by FDA’s regulatory apparatus).
153. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
154. § 154(a)(2). The twenty-year patent term begins when the patent application
is filed. Id. The average length of time required post-patent and pre-aBLA is
typically seven-and-a-half to eight years. Sorscher, supra note 17, at 295. As science
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processes, strong patent protection is not always available. Therefore,
the exclusivity period must provide the manufacturer with sufficient
incentive to disclose valuable biologics process information. Because
one patent can produce upwards of ninety percent of a
manufacturer’s revenue, manufacturers must decide exactly what
information to disclose and how to claim their process while ensuring
they reap all benefits from a robust patent and subsequent monopoly.
A patent prevents others from making, using, offering to sell, or
selling the patented invention.155 Patent applications have specific
disclosure requirements, embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which include:
describing the claimed invention in sufficient detail such that (1)
“one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor has
possession of the claimed invention” and (2) one skilled in the art
can make and use the application’s defined claims.156 In other words,
a patent must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the
invention.157 A patent’s term may extend beyond any FDA exclusivity
period; because additional clinical trials are incentivized with FDA
approval extensions, biologics manufacturers can test new methods
and tools of manufacture within the scope and duration of previously
patented claims.158 Furthermore, patents offer protection capabilities
not available under the BPCIA, especially with respect to
manufacturing process alterations and potential new therapeutic uses
stemming from process changes.
Biologic drugs having larger, more complex structures than smallmolecule drugs illustrates the additional difficulties within patent
protection of biological products. There is more potential for designarounds: an RPS cannot broaden its patent to incorporate minor
design-arounds or encompass claims not originally enabled by the
develops, this duration will likely shorten and the manufacturer will need more
incentive to pursue aBLA exclusivity grants.
155. § 271(a).
156. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §§ 2163, 2164 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015)
[hereinafter MPEP].
157. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Acting as a lever to spur scientific advancement, the
degree of distinctly claiming an invention inherently changes as scientific
achievements enable manufacturers to piece together how process parameters
correlate with final product attributes.
158. If the operational regulatory philosophy is to provide society with a greater
guarantee of safety, the FDA would necessitate clinical trials. Dudzinski, supra note
75, at 232. Because clinical trials are necessary for any change in safety, efficacy, or
purity, this provides manufacturers with an opportunity to show manufacturability
and thus patentability.
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patent’s specification.159 Nevertheless, the cost of designing the
manufacturing process, instituting clinical trials, and obtaining FOB
product approval acts as a barrier in itself—fewer parties will
challenge the validity of its patents (compared to small-molecule
RPSs) and fewer instances of prior art establishing anticipation or
obviousness, ensuring more patents remain valid.160 Due to these
inherent barriers and the ability to threaten enforcement of patents
covering biologics after the twelve-year exclusivity period, patents will
continue to play a governing role in protection, disclosure, and
innovation for biologics manufacturers.
A. Claiming User Rights for Biologics and Biosimilar Manufacturers
Pioneer biologics and FOB sponsors have similar disclosure
concerns for patentable subject matter and subsequent claim scope
requirements. A Biologic’s patent application claims typically fall in
one of three categories:
(1) composition claims,161 (2)
162
method/process claims, and (3) source claims.163 Because biologic
products are closely correlated to their manufacturing
method/process, composition claims and method/process claims are
intertwined.164 Therefore, when an applicant is deciding whether to

159. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); MPEP § 2163.06.
160. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 617.
161. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 525 (“[A] patent on the
drug’s active ingredient allows the patentee to exclude others from making, selling, or
using the drug for any use, even those uses not specifically envisioned by the patentee.”).
162. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1807 (“[M]ethod patents are
particularly hard to enforce in part because methods are kept secret, so infringement
frequently goes unobserved.”). But see id. (“If firms effectively disclose their methods,
observing patent infringement becomes easier, which increases incentives to pursue
patents in the first place.”). “[P]rocess elements should not limit the scope of a
claim to a novel product . . . because process elements cannot impart novelty to a
composition claim directed to a known product . . . .” Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on
Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s Compliance with the
Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 121–22 (2010) (citing Scripps
Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
163. See generally Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33.
164. Composition claims, however, have traditionally been considered much more
powerful than process claims. These types of claims may prove to provide broad
patent protection as well as information sharing and ultimately can aid innovation in
the field. Feldman & Price, supra note 103, at 792. Composition claims are uniquely
appropriate for claiming certain products of biotechnology “when the product is new
and unobvious, but has a process-based limitation.” Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex
Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing E.P.
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protect a novel and nonobvious claim, biologics and biosimilars
manufacturers have a significant incentive to determine realistic ROI
by analyzing patent and trade secrecy protection enforcement
capabilities.165 Furthermore, when a successful drug sponsor is
awarded a guaranteed limited market monopoly, the company will
more easily justify the expense and risk of R&D.166
B. Obtaining the Right to Exclude
Biologics manufacturers constantly evaluate the value of their
manufacturing processes. Manufacturing drift is an opportunity for
biologics manufacturers to reassess their manufacturing processes.
These necessary reassessments during exclusivity periods provide
opportunities for manufacturers to determine how to improve their
process. Therefore, an assessment of patentable subject matter and
trade secret protection guide each applicants’ level of disclosure;
because patent law prevents inventors from receiving both patent and
trade secret protection, a biologics manufacturer must also evaluate
which mode of protection best suits its innovation and corporatemarket goals.167
1.

Patentability hurdles for biologics and biosimilars
Patentable subject matter is a baseline criterion that each
manufacturer must assess prior to pursuing protection and/or
exclusivity grants. Patentable subject matter is “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
Mirabel, Product-by-Process Claims: A Practical Perspective, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 3 (1986)).
165. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (setting out the conditions for patentability based
on novelty); § 103 (setting out the conditions for patentability based on non-obvious
subject matter). Patent law encourages disclosure of new discoveries in return for
limited grants of exclusivity, while trade secret laws appear to encourage
concealment of new discoveries, allowing concealed knowledge to be exploited for
an indefinite period of time; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
480–81 (1973). For products whose structure cannot be determined precisely,
process limitations may be the only choice for ensuring the claim meets the
enablement requirement.
166. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 590. The incentive to innovate (or incentive to
commercialize), which includes the entire process of research, development, and
turning an idea into an economically viable finished product, is commonly
recognized as one of three patent/economic theories. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW
OF PATENTS 34–36 (4th ed. 2016). The other two theories are the incentive to invent
and the incentive to disclose. Id.
167. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923 (2011).
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and useful improvement.”168 Patents grant their holder exclusive
rights for a fixed period.169 Seemingly anticompetitive, patents
represent a legal “right to exclude,” producing a limited monopoly.170
The patent application is first received by the USPTO, where a
prima facie determination is made as to the sufficiency of the
application’s completion.171 Thus, the USPTO determines the scope
of a patent, which influences the development of technology—both
regarding standards of current applicant material and future
development upon disclosed information.172
There are essentially four requirements or hurdles for patentability
and approval of the patent application: (1) statutory subject
matter,173 (2) non-obviousness,174 (3) novelty,175 and (4) descriptive
168. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Inventors cannot patent laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas; however, courts have struggled with what constitutes an abstract
idea and what constitutes an inventive concept because “any claim, described at a
certain level of generality, can be challenged as directed to an abstract idea.”
Fairfield Indus. v. Wireless Seismic, Inc., No. 4:1-CV-2972, 2014 WL 7342525, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014); Steven M. Amundson, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Has Taken a Heavy Toll on Patents for Computer Related Inventions,
FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/insights/
Detail.aspx?news=2854e313-72d2-4a5c-a27a-4a9a10ff34e5&. After the 2014 decision
in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (holding that an abstract idea is not
patentable), about seventy percent of challenges for failure to claim patent-eligible
subject matter have succeeded. Amundson, supra.
169. Epstein, supra note 94, at 288.
170. Id. at 315; Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2012).
171. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding
that “the language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim
interpretation”), amended by 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
172. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 840, 842; supra notes 156–57 and
accompanying text.
173. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Statutory subject matter determines what can and cannot be
patented, with a societal benefit or usefulness nexus.
174. § 103. “‘Section 101 is not so narrow’ as to prevent the patenting of any
innovative method that acts on something naturally occurring.” David A. Zwally, The
Federal Circuit Clarifies the Scope of § 101 in Pharmaceutical Related Patents, FROMMER
LAWURENCE & HAUG LLP (July 5, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/The-Federal-CircuitClarifies-the-Scope-of--101-in-Pharmaceutical-Related-Patents-07-11-20161.
Thus,
even if you are the first inventor to conceptualize and reduce to practice, the
invention must be a large enough leap or difference from what came before that
patenting is warranted and deserved.
175. § 102. Novelty is an assessment of whether an invention has been done
before. There are inherent statutory and priority bars encompassed in the novelty
provision: even if you invent something new, there may be something an applicant
has done, such as public disclosure of the invention’s particulars before securing the
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requirements.176 The descriptive requirement177 is most important
for biological sponsors and innovators because it mandates public
disclosure of the best mode178 contemplated at the time of
application.179 Courts tend not to treat patents that merely improve
prior art as equivalents.180 However, when a patent represents a
pioneer, novel invention with societal value and impact, courts tend
patent, to preclude its ability to patent; and when two patents cover the same claims,
only one can be said to have priority over the other.
176. § 112. Descriptiveness requires adequate disclosure and claiming, embodied
by three requirements: enablement, written description, and definiteness. In other
words, an applicant must describe the invention with enough definitiveness so “as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use” the
invention. Id.
177. Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 5 (stating that enablement “requires a
patentee to provide enough information ‘for a person skilled in the art to make and
use the invention without undue experimentation’” (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Reproducibility and operability of the process play a
critical role in determining whether the manufacturer will disclose enough
information for enablement, yet withhold critical process parameters from being
analyzed and used by another manufacturer/reverse-engineer.
178. See id. (explaining that best mode is “the best mode contemplated by him, as
of the time he executes the application, of carrying out the invention” and “helps fill
the gap between enablement’s minimum disclosure and the inventor’s own
knowledge about her preferred implementation of the invention. [The] purpose ‘is
to restrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time concealing
from the public preferred embodiments of the inventions they have in fact
conceived’” (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)). But see S. 515 111th Cong. § 14 (2009) (providing that a “failure to
disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be
canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable”). Even though the bill died,
both chambers passed bills in 2011 that were substantively identical to the 2009
Senate bill regarding best mode. H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15 (2011) (as passed by
House, June 23, 2011); S. 23, 112th Cong. § 15 (2011) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8,
2011). The Senate ultimately approved the House’s version of patent reform without
amendment on Sept. 8, 2011. 157 Cong. Rec. S5442 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011)
(approved 89–9)).
179. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 5 (detailing that
enablement has both subjective and objective components:
the subjective
component asks “‘whether the inventor considered a particular mode of practicing
the invention to be superior to all other modes at the time of filling’ the
application,” and then, if so, the objective question becomes whether the applicant
“adequately disclose[d] the mode . . . considered to be superior” (quoting Teleflex,
299 F.3d at 1330).
180. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 860. However, “short of uncovering a
smoking gun in discovery, an accused infringer often cannot tell ex post that a trade
secret asserted today was the patentee’s best mode years prior.” Love & Seaman,
supra note 170, at 13.
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to provide broader ranges of entitlement.181 When an innovation
represents a wholly novel formulation, clearly progressing the art of
science, it will receive a larger scope of patent protection.182
2.

Premise of trade secrecy while adjusting to the AIA
Biologics manufacturing processes are large and complex systems
where small changes may eliminate effectiveness or raise safety concerns.
Similarly, claimed or patented biologics manufacturing processes restrict
protection of manufacturing to precisely the claimed process, making
reverse-engineering or design-around claims easy to discover. Trade
secrets offer certainty in a consistently evolving biologics market
dominated by uncertain patent scope and claim protection.
Trade secrets include “any information that can be used in the
operation of a business or other enterprise,” in which such
knowledge is “sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others.”183 Such value of trade
secrets in biologics applications applies to manufacturing processes,
which “may consist of any commercially valuable plan, formula,
process, or device that is used for the making, preparing,
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be
said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial
effort.”184 However, the most important aspect of trade secrecy is that
the secret actually remains a secret; without secrecy the applicant’s
rights would “evaporate.”185
Trade secret policy is premised on the applicant’s due diligence in
determining the degree of economic value received from a trade secret’s

181. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 854.
182. Id.
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995);
Epstein, supra note 94, at 289, 301, 307; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (asserting that safety and effectiveness data submitted by
Monsanto to the Environmental Protection Agency was a property interest
cognizable by the Takings Clause insofar as the information was protected by the
laws of Missouri as a trade secret).
184. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (2016); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985) (defining a trade secret as any information that derives
actual or potential economic value from “not being readily ascertainable” and that is “the
subject of [measures] reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”);
Epstein, supra note 94, at 289 (providing additional definitions for “trade secret” from the
Third Restatement of Unfair Competition and the First Restatement of Torts).
185. Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 3.
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competitive edge.186 Simultaneously, this due diligence dissolves any
Takings Clause concerns.187 Takings concerns are built into the Federal
Trade Secrets Act, which effectively prevents FDA regulators from
“disclosing ‘any information’ that relates to ‘trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus’ if the information was obtained”
as part of the operation of the regulators’ job.188
The FDA takes a broad stance in defining manufacturing processes
and designs for trade secrecy purposes.189 There can feasibly be a per
se taking of a manufacturing process—whether it is a patent or trade
secret.190 However, per se takings issues premised on any type of
notice provided in legislation will dissolve these claims as the
government is providing compensation in the form of market
exclusivity and patent exclusivity rights.
Lastly, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) of 2011191 plays
an important role in the decision making process for applicants.192 Not
only do biologics and biosimilars applications require a certain
threshold of safety and efficacy data, but patent applications also require
a minimum level of disclosure.193 The disclosure process during patent
application approval and the patent dance (an infringement or
invalidity assertion) includes providing an application with the “best
mode” when reduced to practice and an inter partes review proceeding to

186. An inventor’s choice of trade secrecy illustrates her belief that research costs
can be recouped without the advantages and drawbacks of patent exclusivity.
Anderson, supra note 167, at 938.
187. See Epstein, supra note 94, at 324.
188. Id. at 289.
189. Id. at 290.
190. See id. at 299 (explaining that a per se taking of intellectual property does not
require “physical dispossession”).
191. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
192. See generally Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 3–4 (asserting that the
America Invents Act (AIA) has blurred the dividing line between patents and trade
secrets because the validity of patents no longer hinges on whether an applicant
discloses the best mode).
193. Id. at 5; see also Stanley S. Wang & John J. Smith, Potential Legal Barriers to
Increasing CMS/FDA Collaboration: The Law of Trade Secrets and Related Considerations,
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 613, 617 (2003) (stating that “a marketing application’s
contents is governed by . . . 21 C.F.R. part 20, reflecting agency policy to[] ‘make the
fullest possible disclosure of records to the public, consistent with the rights of
individuals to privacy, the property rights of persons in trade secrets and confidential
commercial or financial information, and the need for the agency to promote frank
internal policy deliberations and to pursue its regulatory activities without
disruption’” (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 20.20(a) (2016)).
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determine directly whether the parties assert infringement.194 Thus, the
AIA is generally known to aid with establishing broad prior user rights
through disclosure requirements, thereby implicating trade-secrecy
valuations for originators and applicants.195
Due to the dramatic increase in litigation since the AIA’s
implementation caused by patent trolls,196 the Innovation Act197 was
introduced on October 23, 2013. Even though the Innovation Act has
not been approved, the underlying contention is that discovery
procedures and claim construction play a critical role in abating the
impact of patent trolls.198 Still, these protections are not enough, and
the rise in litigation will “increase the level of investment and risk
associated with enforcing patent rights,” further pushing biologics
manufacturers towards trade secrecy protection.199 The increase in costs
from pre-suit investigations and “loser pays”200 systems may ultimately

194. See Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 13; supra note 180.
195. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., No. 11-3962, 2016 WL
832089 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2106) (holding that the inventors’ non-informing
exploitation of the invention was not patent defeating prior art). Parties that exploit
secret inventions may continue their use even after a third-party patents the same
invention; before the AIA, the first inventor could have been sued by a second who
happened to be first to patent. See Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 15 (“[T]he
AIA’s expansion of prior user rights considerably reduces the risks associated with
protecting preferred embodiments as trade secrets.”).
196. Elizabeth J. Murphy, H.R. 3309, The Innovation Act, FROMMER LAWRENCE &
HAUG LLP (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.flhlaw.com/insights/Detail.aspx?news=3f5f0d
02-4972-42df-b411-263ae1b72fa4&. Patent trolls, also known “as non-practicing
entities, patent assertion entities, and patent monetizers,” are beginning to infiltrate
non-core or auxiliary patents—such as manufacturing processes—due to the
complex nature of life sciences patents and litigations. Feldman & Price, supra note
103, at 773–75, 777, 781. Patent trolls use patents as bargaining chips to charge
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy a license to practice a patent. For
Unified Patents’ statistical analysis of patent quality and high risk troll activity zones,
see Transactions, UNIFIED PATS., https://www.unifiedpatents.com/transactions (last
visited Feb. 5, 2017).
197. H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013).
198. Murphy, supra note 196 (explaining that the Innovation Act would have
heightened pleading requirements, shifted fees, limited discovery before claim
construction, and established patent ownership transparency in order to place a
higher burden on these trolls).
199. Id.
200. Id. (explaining that “loser pays” means that “the nonprevailing party pays
reasonable fees and costs unless its position and conduct is . . . ‘reasonably
justified’”).
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discourage patentees from seeking to protect their rights as eagerly.201
Generally though, the Innovation Act drives toward transparency in
return for increased disclosure by—and protection of—patentees.202
IV. CURRENT STATE AND THE IDEAL STATE OF INNOVATION IN
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS
Biologics manufacturers value their manufacturing processes and
determine whether protection and exclusivity grants are more certain
and more valuable than trade secrecy. The recent decision in Amgen
Inc. v. Apotex Inc. held that the biosimilars’ notice of commercial
marketing is required regardless of whether the applicant partook in a
patent dance.203 Additionally, the decision in Amgen Inc. v. Hospira,
Inc.204 prevented Amgen from obtaining manufacturing information
from Hospira deemed non-relevant to the patents-in-suit. Lastly, the
U.S. Supreme Court will review the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amgen
Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.205 and assess whether the biosimilar maker must
provide advance notice of marketing—essentially influencing whether
the RPS will reap an additional six-month exclusivity period post-aBLA
approval—and whether the applicant must participate in the patent
dance with the RPS.206 The decision will not only impact the type and
degree of manufacturing information exchanged between applicant
and sponsor, but it will also affect how quickly consumers will be able

201. Id. (declaring that the Innovation Act “also provides grounds for an alleged
infringer to challenge the sufficiency of initial pleadings before engaging in the
merits of the case”).
202. See id. (recognizing that the Innovation Act “mandates an ‘ongoing’ duty to
disclose patent ownership information . . . within 90 days” of any update, and that
“[f]ailure to comply” with the mandate may result in fees, expenses, and damages).
203. Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
No. 16-332, 2016 WL 4944497 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016). A notice of commercial
marketing informs the RPS that their customer market will soon be undercut. To
adapt, the RPS will need to sell its drug at a lower price or explain to its consumers
why its product is worth a higher price than its competitor’s, such as a better
manufacturing process. Because a biosimilars manufacturer does not have to
provide the notice to the RPS until after market approval, the RPS should have this
information readily available to adapt prior to the end of its market exclusivity.
204. No. 15-839-RGA, 2016 WL 7013483 (D. Del. Nov. 30, 2016), appeal filed, 162179 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 25, 2016).
205. 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13,
2017) (Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195).
206. U.S. SUPREME COURT, 15-1039 SANDOZ INC. V. AMGEN INC.: QUESTION PRESENTED,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01039qp.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
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to purchase cheaper biosimilars.207 These judicial decisions not only
illustrate the value applicants place on exclusivity grant durations and
their underlying manufacturing processes,208 but they also provide
bases for interpreting regulatory provisions and conducting ROI
calculations. Based upon current judicial209 and legislative trends as
well as consumer demand, data exclusivity valuations have encouraged
investment into FOBs as opposed to novel, less lucrative, and highly
specialized disease treatments.210
A. Shape-up or Shake-up from Judicial Decisions: Enhancing the Value of
Exclusivity
Even though judicial decisions do not directly address whether
market or data exclusivity periods provide a proper degree of
incentive to innovate biologics manufacturing processes, these
decisions influence whether pioneers and subsequent innovators seek
those exclusivities. In the last three decades, courts have shaped
these incentives in the biologics market.211 For instance, in Scripps
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,212 the Northern District
of California held that Scripps, a nonprofit research organization, did
not disclose the purification method that embodied the best mode at
the time the application was submitted.213 A robust disclosure of the
scientific methodology reinforces applicants’, as well as pioneers’,
ability to predict potential claims of subsequent innovators, and their
use of process terms inherently limits the scope of product-by-process
207. Jeff Overley, High Court Takes up Amgen-Sandoz Biosimilar Brawl, LAW360 (Jan.
13, 2017, 2:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/792493/high-court-takes-upamgen-sandoz-biosimilar-brawl.
208. See Woodage, supra note 39, at 16 (explaining that applicants have to “thread
[a] needle” by using manufacturing processes different enough not to infringe, yet
similar enough to meet biosimilarity standards).
209. As of October 2016, there were five ongoing biologic/biosimilar lawsuits, in
addition to Amgen v. Apotex (Neulasta/pegfilgrastim), Amgen v. Hospira
(Epogen/epoetin alfa), and Amgen v. Sandoz (Neupogen/filgrastim). Aron Fischer,
Biosimilar
Litigation
Update,
BIOLOGICS
BLOG
(Oct.
25,
2016),
http://www.biologicsblog.com/blog/biosimilar-litigation-update.
210. Sorscher, supra note 17, at 303.
211. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–
1300, 1302, 1305 (2012) (illustrating patent protection as a “two edged sword,” potentially
“tie[ing] up too much future use” and therefore requiring claims to possess a degree of
specificity and enhancement relevant to the pertinent scientific community).
212. 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
overruled by Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
213. Id. at 1554–55.
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claims. The first Federal Circuit court ruling in Scripps explained that
“claims are construed independent of the accused product, in light of
the specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art.”214 Thus,
by limiting the scope of the claims to specific manufacturing
processes, applicants are able to ensure noninfringement by
engineering around a pioneer’s best mode at the time their
application was filed.215 Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.216 held that if an accused infringer of
a composition claim with a process limitation can show that the
product was made by a different process, then there can be no
warranted finding of infringement.217 Interpreting the Atlantic
Thermoplastics and Scripps decisions in tandem, “infringement requires
the presence of every claim limitation or its equivalent,” otherwise the
limitation does not read on the claim and subsequent innovators
have freedom to operate.218
The claim limitation concept is directly applicable to biologics
innovators attempting to assert subservient patents against an RPS’s
dominant patent. The RPS may attempt to create early, broad patents,
which would disincentivize FOB manufacturers and subsequent
pioneers’ process refinement assessments. However, the Atlantic
Thermoplastics and Scripps decisions incentivize research in new and
creative modes of manufacturing the same biological product with
alternative manufacturing processes, or different biological products
with similar claims but non-equivalent limitations. As biologics
quantification methodology improves, pioneers will carve out highly
refined composition claims of their own, enhancing discernibility of
infringing claims. Ultimately, increased competition will ensure that
the best manufacturing processes dominate the market.

214. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1580. If the patent claims are “granted on the product,
rather than the process for making it, subsequent process research by others will be
discouraged.” Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 904.
215. Even though equivalency in manufacturing process is measured at the time
of infringement, validity—the claim scope embodied in § 112’s requirements—is
measured at the time of filing.
216. 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
217. Id. at 846–47.
218. Id. at 846. Compare Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583 (emphasizing that the product of
a product-by-process claim is not limited by the process steps recited in the claim for
purposes of analyzing alleged infringement), with Atl. Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846–
47 (articulating that process limitations in a product-by-process claim cannot be
ignored when evaluating alleged infringement).
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The Federal Circuit has also made strides towards reinforcing
process innovation. In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,219 for
example, the Federal Circuit explicitly overruled Scripps and adopted
the rule from Atlantic Thermoplastics.220 The Federal Circuit in Abbott
held that process limitations in product-by-process claims are as
effective as limitations in an infringement analysis.221 Therefore, a
biologics manufacturer claiming a process for making a
biopharmaceutical compound can protect the process from
infringement, even when a different pharmaceutical is produced by
the process. And in Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC,222 the Federal Circuit
was concerned with composition claims whose properties or
structures are highly process- or source-dependent,223 a concept vitally
important to biologics manufacturers. Because § 112 requires one
skilled in the art to practice “the full scope of the claimed
invention,”224 reproducibility within the scientific and manufacturing
communities requires operating and verifying the process or source
limitations, without undue experimentation.225
Ultimately, the
Federal Circuit held that the patentee’s broad claim language
surpassed the teachings—or scope of enablement—within the patent
specification, and the claims were therefore non-commensurate with
the enrichment of public knowledge.226
219. 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
220. Id. at 1291, 1293.
221. Id. at 1293–95.
222. 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
223. See id. at 995–96 (discussing a dispute over video game versus movie technology).
224. Id. at 1000.
225. Karshtedt, supra note 162, at 116, 155.
226. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999 (citing Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). In U.S. patent law, claims define the scope of
legal protection that the federal government grants to the owner or exclusive
licensee of a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (establishing that a patent
application shall include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming . . . the invention”); see also § 154(a) (addressing the rights of a patent
owner or licensee, the patent term, and the content of a patent). But when
construed in view of the recent Phillips decision, “claim construction [can] result in a
narrower claim scope.” Bryan J. Braunel, USPTO Amends AIA Rules, FROMMER
LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (May 3, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/USPTO-Amends-AIARules-05-03-2016. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Association for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), was particularly interested in retaining
sufficient incentives for biotech firms to ensure future innovation is not inhibited.
Id. at 2116 (addressing patent breadth with respect to DNA, which is best described
by its structure rather than by function). After all, “too broad an interpretation of
this exclusionary principle” will limit incentive to protect novel, societally beneficial
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The Senate’s unanimous approval of the Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA)227 on April 4, 2016, should reinforce the security of
innovators’ property rights.228 Creating a baseline for enabled
disclosure while reinforcing trade secret viability ensures innovators
focus their time and monetary investments towards holes in prior art;
thus, increasing the value of enabled innovation.
The Federal Circuit recognizes that biological product applications
have interrelated claims—source, composition, and process claims
may all be part of an applicant’s claimed biopharmaceutical.229
Biologics manufacturers see the capabilities that biologics licenses
provide, yet they strategically navigate the statutory and regulatory
framework to minimize scientific knowledge disclosure.230 Sitrick
exemplifies how the Federal Circuit requires essential, reproducible
knowledge for enablement in an application, knowing those same
claims may be used to limit competition in the future.231
Still, the Supreme Court’s FTC v. Actavis, Inc.232 and Third Circuit’s
Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott233 decisions have cast a shadow
over the biologics market, potentially affecting an alleged infringer’s
ability to receive payment in return for staying off the market for a
specific period.234 At issue in both cases was whether a viable antitrust
challenge may be claimed against a pay-for-delay, or reverse-payment
settlement, scheme. Essentially, the underlying actions at issue involved
“product hopping,” whereby insignificant modifications are made to the

inventions that all, to some degree, “embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
227. Pub. L. No. 114-529 (2016).
228. Jessica L. Sblendorio, The Defend Trade Secrets Act: A Remedy Background and
Implementation, FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (Apr. 28, 2016),
http://www.flhlaw.com/DefendTradeSecrets.
229. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1358–68 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
230. Minimizing patent and regulatory disclosure reinforces licensing schemes,
such that licensees must purchase competitor’s materials in order to feasibly
manufacture and commercialize the biologic independently.
Dan L. Burk,
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121,
140 (1994). In the biologics manufacturing industry, inventors would retain
“essential know-how” through secrecy while obtaining patent protection with
strategic disclosure. Anderson, supra note 167, at 941.
231. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
232. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
233. 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
234. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 102. See generally Joshua B. Fischman, The
Circular Logic of Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 91 (2016).
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pioneer drug, extending the drug’s exclusivity, thereby forcing
subsequent generic competitors off the market and requiring they restart the regulatory process.235 Relevant to the biologics industry are the
outer edges of these decisions, which required applicants to come to the
table with product reformulations that provide patient benefits.236 Once
patient benefits are proven to the reference product manufacturer,
these case decisions provide reason to believe that any reverse-payment
settlements would be permitted as an economically efficient means to
resolve infringement litigation.237 Thus, societal health impact is an
inherent consideration and bar that innovators must surmount to justify
their reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
Lastly, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. was the first Federal Circuit
decision to substantively interpret the BPCIA.238 The Supreme
Court’s decision to review the Federal Circuit’s ruling “will have a
significant economic impact on both reference product sponsors and
biosimilar applicants.”239 The Amgen decision from 2015 held that (1)
a biosimilar applicant is not required to participate in the patent
exchange procedure outlined within section 351(I) of the PHSA, and
(2) a biosimilar applicant must provide the reference product sponsor
with 180 days’ notice of commercial marketing only after the FDA
approves the biosimilar application.240
Nevertheless, biosimilar applicants may currently choose to not
participate in the patent exchange process.241 Even though the
Federal Circuit holding gives a biosimilar applicant more control
over patent disclosure and litigation processes, the RPS will not have
the benefit of the patent exchange procedure to determine similarity
to an FOB and its manufacturing processes, making it more difficult
for the RPS to meet heightened pleading requirements.242
235. Mylan, 838 F.3d at 426; see also Mark S. Levy, Big Pharma Monopoly: Why
Consumers Keep Landing on “Park Place” and How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV.
247, 276–79 (2016) (defining product hopping’s roll in anticompetitive schemes
carried out by pharmaceutical companies).
236. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 104.
237. Id. at 103.
238. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351–62 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195).
239. Colletti & Worley, supra note 145.
240. Amgen, 794 F.3d 1356–58, 1360; see also Colletti & Worley, supra note 145.
241. Colletti & Worley, supra note 145.
242. Id. (“[Section] 351(I)(9)(C) does not adequately address a reference product
sponsor’s needs because it is only directed to composition and method of use claims
and not manufacturing and process claims.”); see also Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff,
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B. Incentivizing High-Quality Innovation for Biologics Manufacturers
The biologics regulatory pathway must enable biologics
manufacturers to respond quickly to scientific and technological
growth. A biopharmaceutical market that constantly reassesses and
protects innovation will incentivize manufacturers to disclose new
manufacturing process knowledge in return for grants of
exclusivity.243
Innovation reflects a stronger grasp of process
knowledge. Manufacturers typically innovate upon prior art and
patent novel processes when the short-term sacrifice is worth the
long-term return.244 Biosimilars innovation takes the forms of
“enhanced overall design,”245 new therapeutic uses for approved
drugs,246 and lower costs for consumers. Cumulative innovation is
particularly applicable to biologics and biosimilars manufacturing
processes during the current rapid growth of the biosimilars
market.247 Cumulative innovation includes better processes for
manufacturing a similar drug248 and safer, more efficacious drugs
from more controlled manufacturing processes.249
AbbVie Sues Amgen on 10 of 100 Humira Patents (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.foley.com/abbvie-sues-amgen-on-10-of-100-humira-patents-08-09-2016
(showing that leading the first round of the patent dance enables the biosimilar
applicant to strategically target weaker RPS claims).
243. Cf. Jennifer L. Bachorik & Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, USPTO Launches
Patents 4 Patients, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.foley.com/uspto
-launches-patents-4-patients-08-02-2016 (illustrating that frequent disclosure
opportunities and constant incentive to innovate may be more important than an
expedited approval process).
244. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 878 (emphasis omitted) (assuming
innovation responds quickly to market demands and introduces consumers to new
improvements).
245. See id. at 859.
246. See id. at 883. But see W. Nicholson Price II & Timo Minssen, Will Clinical Trial
Data Disclosure Reduce Incentives to Develop New Uses of Drugs?, 33 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 685, 685 (2015) (revealing that not all new uses for approved or
patented drugs are patentable).
247. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 898. The capacity and opportunity to
innovate increases as the industry develops new drugs and prepares for the
development of future therapeutic uses. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra
note 8, at 346. For a discussion of why prospective patenting is of particular
relevance where there is a continuum—or series—of opportunities to develop the
commercialization of biologics while responding to market demands, see generally
Nithya Anand, Accommodating Long Term Scientific Progress: Patent Prospects in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 17 (2010).
248. Huzair & Kale, supra note 38, at 251.
249. Id.
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Quality, on the other hand, creates a scale to measure innovation.
Quality assessments typically require comparative analyses but also
require fiscal justification for enhanced process control, and new
product formulation and design.250 These regulation-mandated quality
assessments are important because, from the viewpoint of a market
consumer, quality is hard to observe.251 Once a drug is approved for
sale in commerce, the regulatory structure has difficulty “detect[ing]
quality problems and impos[ing] restrained response[s].”252
High-quality innovation stems from information sharing.253 Just as
there are degrees of information sharing,254 there are degrees of quality,
and the incentive structure must account for these varying innovation
levels and their impact on societal health.255 Clinical superiority,
required by the Orphan Drug Act regulations, is demonstrated by
therapeutic advantages from clinical trials or major contributions to
patient care.256 The current four- and twelve-year regimented structures
do not keep pace with science; biologics manufacturing processes drift
with time, and if a manufacturer can obtain more process control, then
it should not feel restricted to wait until their exclusivity period lapses.
Altering manufacturing processes in pursuit of clinically superior
biologics will occur in a less regimented exclusivity structure.
Therapeutically advantageous products, in return for regulatory

250. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 559.
251. See id. at 558–59 n.429 (noting that particularly for sterile injectable drugs,
consumers already have compromised immune systems, making differentiation
between drug contamination and infection difficult).
252. Id. at 559. For an illustrative example of systemic quality issues from one of
the United States’ largest sterile, injectable drug manufacturers, Hospira, see Zachary
Brennan, Slew of Recalls, Form 483 Shake Hospira, IN-PHARMA TECHNOLOGIST (Mar. 9,
2015) http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/Regulatory-Safety/Slew-of-recalls-Form483-shake-Hospira.
253. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics
Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2016) [hereinafter
Manufacturing Barriers].
254. Id. at 1030, 1045 (stating that sharing information has advantages from both
patent and trade secrecy law: publishing fundamental knowledge about biologics
manufacturing processes through patent law, while fostering licensing through trade
secrecy). Similarly, reverse-engineering can explore alternative methodology, which
ultimately may be cost-effective or therapeutically superior. Id. at 1049.
255. See Stroud, supra note 88, at 638 (advocating for degrees of regulator stringency,
or a sliding scale, depending upon a biologics product classification system).
256. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3) (2015); see Dudzinski, supra note 75, at 201. By creating
an alternative orphan drug regulatory pathway, the legislature recognizes varying degrees
of quality and the importance of incentivizing hard-to-manufacture drugs.
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certainty and efficiency, provide manufacturers with the incentive to
invest in therapeutically advantageous processes.
C. Incentivizing Biologicals Manufacturers with an Exclusivity Tier System
The pharmaceutical industry, compared to other industries like hi-tech,
spends much more on R&D but with intimidating rates of failure.257 To
overcome these high barriers to entry, biologics and biosimilars
manufacturers must have the fiscal incentive to innovate and the
knowledge that new, proven manufacturing achievements will provide
additional ROI. Currently, the FDA rarely grants market exclusivity
privileges for manufacturing process improvements alone; hence,
manufacturing processes—or at least large portions thereof—are typically
withheld as trade secrets or strategically claimed within companion
composition claims.258 As a result, significant opportunity exists in
regulatory framework to incentivize R&D of biologics manufacturing
processes. After all, every biopharmaceutical compound is not created
equal, so why should their exclusivity grant durations all be equal?
Innovation saves both patients and insurance companies from
substantial
cost
while
reducing
governmental
healthcare
259
expenditures.
Just as legislatures reinforce collaborative drug
development research, they also should reinforce research,
development, and implementation of collaborative innovative
manufacturing
methodology—especially
with
respect
to
biopharmaceuticals, which provide large societal health implications.
Legislatures could directly reinforce collaboration by providing
incentives to adhere to a more robust biologic disclosure system.260 Even
though longstanding executive branch policies have impaired politically-

257. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 785.
258. Id. at 523.
259. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 343 (“[E]xpenditures on
drugs make up over [fifteen] percent of health care costs . . . ; see also id. at 346
(estimating that reducing manufacturing inefficiency could save fifteen to ninety
billion dollars annually worldwide; in the United States, that could result in
consumer surplus gains of $47.4 billion annually or increased R&D health gains
worth $574 billion annually).
260. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101 (“The BPCIA contains a number of
exclusivity provisions designed to reward innovation in developing biologics and
encourage future research and development; see Price, Making Do in Making Drugs,
supra note 103, at 497, 509 (asserting that “calibrated policy successfully drives
innovation in drug discovery and development, but not in drug manufacturing,”
which is why disclosure and discourse must be economically incentivized).
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driven innovation,261 the Obama Administration has recently
emphasized that when the government is needed to “help spur
technological advances and broaden technology adoption . . . the
Federal Government can help catalyze advances, promote market-based
innovation, and encourage more competitive market outcomes.”262
Disclosure axiomatically drives innovation.263 All designs—not just
follow-ons and biobetters—use some sort of prior art discourse to
their advantage combined with their own innovative capabilities. A
robust disclosure-incentive system revolves around the four- and
twelve-year exclusivity provisions outlined in the BPCIA.264
Essentially, the sponsor will disclose the minimum information
necessary to enable someone skilled in the art to understand the
novelty of the biological manufacturing processes. Thus, disclosure
during the patent filing and protection process is the ratedetermining step for innovation built upon prior art.
However, trade secrecy provides value through predictability and
should not be abandoned completely for increased discourse.265 Trade
secret protection is a compromise with the legislature on which the fourand twelve-year exclusivity valuations are built: originators will disclose
only what the government can economically entice the originator to
261. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 840, 842.
262. Price & Rai, supra note 253, at 1059 (quoting Memorandum from Aneesh
Chopra, U.S. Chief Tech. Officer, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, et al., to the Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 2 (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.iccsafe.org/gr/Documents/
AdoptionToolkit/FedStandardsMemo-011712.pdf (identifying health-care technology
as a national priority).
263. Price & Rai, supra note 42, at 189.
264. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101 (“The BPCIA restricts a follow-on
manufacturer from filing an application until four years after approval of the reference
biologic . . . [and] further provides the reference manufacturer with a 12-year [market]
exclusivity period, during which the FDA cannot approve an FOB relying on the
innovator’s prior showing of safety, purity, and potency for approval.”).
265. See Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 14 n.65 (reinforcing use of the prior
user defense, such that trade secrecy provides a limited window of enforceable rights,
prior to patenting). Section 112 of the Patent Act requires “[t]he specification shall
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). Otherwise,
non-enabling disclosures are of very little value to the public and do not allow
researchers to verify whether the product is identical to the originator; see also Price,
Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 351 (explaining that “trade secrecy creates
incentives for innovation by keeping others from copying the innovation and
therefore allow[s] supracompetitive pricing”).
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disclose. Just as there is no Takings Clause issue when legislation
provides notice of the required patent dance and aBLA application
criteria, the government must allow originators to withhold certain trade
secrets when it is a viable and legitimate business option.266
Holistically, innovation through disclosure occurs by one of three
methods:
(1) mandating disclosure, (2) incentivizing
discourse/disclosure through market exclusivity periods, or (3)
letting applicants meet bare minimum requirements from USPTO
and aBLA statutory standards. The manner in which these methods
impact society267 and how the impact can be tailored through the
FDA’s grant of market exclusivity are examined below.
1.

Incentive scheme must be capable of responding to scientific improvements
For the biologics and biosimilars market to gain acceptance and
accelerate market growth of biopharmaceuticals—bolstering
investments and innovation within the field—the public must view these
therapies as safer and of higher quality.268 Biopharmaceuticals have the
opportunity to be a therapeutically superior product relative to smallmolecule drugs.269 Viewing these medications as superior270 and worth
consumers’ financial investments makes sense, but with so much money
at stake, it also requires transparency.271 Patients, driven by market
266. However, it is critical to recognize the trade-off: the rights and protections
provided by patents in return for enabled disclosure.
267. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1775.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 74–81.
269. See Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 3, 6 (discussing that “[g]uidance
documents and position statements from established societies worldwide have the
potential to help clinicians, payers, and providers understand” and inform patients of
biological and biosimilar product treatments).
270. The sole purpose of these clinical trials should be proving superiority.
Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 482 (stating that designing current clinical trials
revolves around equivalence; in an equivalence trial, neither superiority nor
inferiority can be tested).
271. Overall, consumer and physician decisions, in conjunction with organizations
like ExpressScripts, inherently consider clinical trials and the transparency of trial
requirements and results. See, e.g., id. at 483 (asserting that non-inferiority trials are
useful for assessing further product investments, because they test whether the new
treatment is at least non-inferior to the control, and if it is, the superiority
hypothesis—which attempts to determine if the experimental group is better than
the control—can be evaluated). “[N]on-inferiority trials are efficient because a
definitive conclusion can be made about a new drug from a single randomized trial,”
enabling manufacturers to facilitate product investment decisions and translate the
underlying value of these decisions to consumers, thereby justifying product pricing
with respect to safety, efficacy, and purity. Id.
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forces, will seek to determine (with their physicians) which medications
are cost-effective. Safety and efficacy transparency will enhance public
health by improving informed health decision making. Furthermore,
the public’s trust in regulatory oversight and the pharmaceutical market
will help drive large cross-border clinical trials for rare diseases, adding
opportunities for innovation and market approval.272
Market acceptance requires an equity analysis because of
disclosure. Pioneers must enjoy a level of reassurance that disclosure
will not impede their ability to recoup an initial investment.273 Patent
scope requirements274 consider and balance these trade-offs for BLAs
and aBLAs.275 Striking the right balance between disclosure and
patent scope will ultimately drive biologics research, and a tiered
system is a step in the right direction.276
Lastly, the scientific state of biologics and their manufacturing
processes develop at an alarmingly quick rate.277 Clearly, natural
272. Price & Minssen, supra note 246, at 685.
273. A pioneer would likely need to go beyond a demonstration of “substantial
equivalence” to win over consumers in a way that would allow them to recover their
investment. See Wang & Smith, supra note 193, at 616 (“[A] determination of
‘substantial equivalence’ may involve data that falls far short of the clinical testing or
experience often required to demonstrate [a] health benefit to the satisfaction of
CMS . . . .”). When assessing Medicare coverage of new products or services, there is
a required “reasonable and necessary” assessment of the new diagnosis or treatment.
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2012). If substantial equivalence data fall short of being
reasonable and necessary, then investments will be for naught.
274. See David J. Kappos & Stuart Graham, The Case for Standard Measures of Patent
Quality, 53 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 19, 19 (2012) [hereinafter Standard Measures of
Patent Quality] (explaining that a patent application involves “a series of claims that
attempts to describe new and nonobvious processes, machines, manufacturing
methods or composition of matter” and that “quality” and therefore patent
specifications and descriptions are the top priority of every patent office).
275. The patent versus trade secrecy dilemma reflects the highly scientific
character of the biologics industry.
Systemic problems of innovation and
competition need to be considered and addressed by innovators during their
decision-making process.
276. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 843.
277. Inevitably, more manufacturers will assess whether they can meet
biosimilarity standards before designing a pioneer drug trial; thus, the scientific state
of methodology for determining biosimilarity will most likely impact the speed at
which biologics science develops. See Strand & Cronstein, supra note 36, at 221
(examining amino acid composition, terminal amino acid sequence of
protein/peptide, presence of disulfide bonds, sulfhydryl groups glycosylation,
protein folding, and some higher order structure profiles; because these tests
examine acceptable batch-to-batch variation, they will need to be employed and
advanced in every manufacturing setting, at every production run).
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“drift” of manufacturing processes allows sponsors to explore
additional novel claims; however, innovators must value these claims
and pursue protection or exclusivity in accordance with their impact
to societal health.278
Still, biologics manufacturers possess a
consistent fear of reverse-engineering, which continues to plague the
patent landscape.279 As scientific knowledge of biologics and their
manufacturing processes increase, the cost of independently
discovering or reverse-engineering originator manufacturing designs
will diminish.280 Superior analytical techniques will establish a
stronger conceptual base of knowledge.
Improved analytical
techniques are particularly important for biologics and biosimilars
manufacturing processes because accurate measurements of process
improvements allow a sponsor to quantitatively predict
enhancements in the product and to societal health. Because process
improvements correspond to structural differences, innovative
analytical techniques will help render claimed material novel.
However, innovative opportunities for biologicals manufacturing will
not flourish unless the current market exclusivity incentive structure
adapts.

278. See McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 409 (determining that, because an
originator product varies over its lifetime, batch-to-batch variability, a.k.a. driftassessments, provide opportunities for innovators to test manufacturing design
alterations, which can ultimately improve safety, purity, efficacy, or cost); see also Bui
et al., supra note 34, at 5 (providing an overview of the manufacturing variability
guidelines set by the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH)).
279. The law does not penalize or bar discovery of the trade secret through
reverse engineering, independent laboratory research, canvassing published
literature, or inadvertent disclosure by the holder. By promoting ethical behavior
among competing businesses, trade secrecy prohibits and penalizes
misappropriation: unauthorized disclosure or use of another’s trade secret when the
information is obtained by improper means or through a breach of confidence. See
supra Part III; see also ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 398 (Ill. 1971) (discussing
that “trade secrets can often be discovered by lawful means” and the difficulty in
ascertaining whether something is a trade secret).
280. Trade secret protection can be easily lost through independent discovery,
reverse engineering, or inadvertent disclosure. “Thus, inventors with discoveries that
are eligible for patent protection are likely to seek such protection rather than
relying on the more mercurial protection of trade secrecy.” Burk, supra note 230, at
127–28 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974)); see also
supra note 92 (explaining that improving manufacturability and prior art
classification will entice inventors to apply for patents earlier in the biologics
development life-cycle).
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2.

Make-it or break-it with market exclusivity
The FDA’s grant of market exclusivity directly influences originators’
and applicants’ analysis of ROI. In return for regulator-facilitated
disclosure, biologics—whether biobetter or simply novel—are provided
with a twelve-year market exclusivity,281 four years of which an
innovator cannot attempt to develop upon the patented material in
conjunction with RPS clinical trial data.282 There are no Takings
Clause concerns when notice of disclosure is accompanied by
regulatory benefits.283
Thus, the BPCIA provides reasonable
“investment-backed expectations,” which must be anticipated when
applying for patent or biological product protection and exclusivity.284
Besides grants of market exclusivity in return for disclosure, patent
protection provides exclusive rights, requiring significant time and
money to reduce to practice. Thus, there needs to be an originatorto-innovator advantage: originators who actively innovate upon their
existing patent and exclusivity grants, as opposed to originators who
cling to the same manufacturing process claimed in their original
application. Originators possess valuable scientific and process
knowledge, which is not easily translated through applications and
claimed inventions.285 Originators are highly capable of using their

281. Overley, supra note 145 (explaining that requiring biosimilar notice in all
circumstances would essentially extend the twelve or twelve-and-a-half year exclusivity
because it is highly unlikely a biosimilar will be licensed under the BPCIA without
being officially approved for sale).
282. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (2012); see supra notes 87–91 and accompanying
text.
283. Epstein, supra note 94, at 296, 313; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (examining the character of the government
action, the economic impact of the action, and whether the government action has
vitiated reasonable investment-backed expectations—which is often the central focus
of regulatory takings analyses); Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d
1340, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that the structure and function of a
prior art was difficult to reproduce and verify, illustrating that a change in process
apparently created a different structure, rendering the claimed material novel).
284. Epstein, supra note 94, at 303. Validity determinations—enablement, written
description, and definiteness—are measured at the time of filing, whereas equivalents
are measured at the time of infringement; thus, consideration of after-arising
technologies would not be considered a reasonable investment-backed decision.
285. See Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (explaining that repurposing
and/or streamlining an innovator’s manufacturing facility to support biobetter
production offers efficiency and economics of scale advantages). Similarly, because
“downstream process optimization” parameters are often withheld as trade secrets,
the originator possesses vital and valuable process-specific knowledge. See Paul A.
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existing knowledge to improve upon their own claimed, prior art.
Similarly, a pioneer’s manufacturing process and product investment is
reduced to practice when their patent provides clear, enabled
descriptions—applicants rely upon the strength of previous patents to
provide strong scientific knowledge to build upon.286 Otherwise,
applicants essentially build biologics manufacturing processes from
scratch, resulting in “unnecessary and wasteful duplication of creative
effort.”287 Any “saved” money, or lower financial burden, will be directed
towards developing and protecting established rights—critical to both
innovators and applicants. Ultimately, there is a lower regulatory barrier
to protecting improvements upon existing claims, and these companies
can employ offensive strategies to protect their drug portfolio.288
Conservation of manufacturing process knowledge through robust
disclosure systems and originator-to-innovator incentives enables the
PTO to more accurately assess patent scope and strength;289 thus, the
originator and/or applicant will enjoy an enhanced level of protection
and the cycle of reinforcing innovation upon existing patent claims

Calvo, Choosing Between Patent and Trade Secret Protection in a Biosimilar World,
BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/choos
ing-between-patent-and-trade-secret-protection-in-a-biosimilar-world-0001.
286. See Anderson, supra note 167, at 966 (“[O]verall investment is reduced when
patent strength is increased for inventions in which secrecy is a viable option.”); see
also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (emphasizing the
importance of circulating the information contained in a patent to those who are
“skilled in the trade” for the public good, in order to “stimulate ideas and the
eventual development of further significant advances in the art”).
287. Standard Measures of Patent Quality, supra note 274, at 20. Still, the nonrivalrous and non-excludable nature of patents allows disclosed claims to become
retrofitted into new processes, thereby imperfectly—and potentially ingeniously—
imitating prior art.
288. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 527, 544 (assuming
valuable or high quality by design, “public disclosure required by a patent can lower
that entry barrier by providing information about both the biologic-specific
manufacturing process and general manufacturing processes for biologics”).
Aranesp, a biobetter of EPO, was launched prior to EPO’s patent expiration, and as a
result Amgen was able to maintain much of its market share after patent expiration.
Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4.
289. See Standard Measures of Patent Quality, supra note 274, at 20 (stating that an
essential role of the government, with respect to supporting scientific and
commercial innovation, is to properly define and enforce property rights); id. at 22
(searching for prior art and making novelty and obviousness determinations are the
most important standards for assessing patent scope during the examination
process).
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would repeat. Accordingly, disclosure will simultaneously promote
oversight through transparency and labor mobility.290
However, understanding why regulator-facilitated disclosure may
not incentivize innovation ensures these limitations are mitigated
through other means.291 Originators and innovators rarely invest in
new uses for their approved drug unless they can be ensured
sufficient exclusivity after approval. Additionally, disclosure severely
limits the patentability of new uses designed by follow-on applicants,
both because of dominant patents and prior art (novelty,
obviousness, and anticipation) issues. Like the originator-innovator
advantage, the exclusivity scheme should provide proportionate
advantages to originators of biological products in return for
manufacturing innovation.
3. Capitalizing on scientific developments requires an adaptable market
exclusivity landscape
Societal health is enhanced when patients benefit from
scientifically superior medications earlier on in their treatments.
Recurring opportunities for grants of data exclusivity within 42 U.S.C.
§ 262(k)(7)(B), subject to case-by-case extensions, will create
frequent fiscally justified process reassessment schemes. Altering data
exclusivity durations by applying a tiered system similarly creates a
much-needed drastic change in the biologics and biosimilars
patenting landscape.
Any potential solution must target lowering barriers while
maintaining safety and incentivizing innovation.292 Ultimately, drug
development and protection costs can be lowered by combining the
socially useful aspects of disclosure with the return on innovative
manufacturing processes provided by secrecy. Granting one to four
additional years of data exclusivity during a biologics’ market
exclusivity period will incentivize applicants to pursue exclusivity
290. Decreasing the importance of secrecy and associated non-disclosure and noncompete agreements promotes labor mobility. See generally Victor M. Harding, Trade
Secrets and the Mobile Employee, 22 BUS. LAW. 395, 396, 407 (1967) (illustrating the
axiomatic risk that employees face when working “in an area where he may make use
of his former employer’s trade secrets,” especially due to the fact that “[y]ounger
employees and engineers have the least sense of loyalty” and more commonly move
from job-to-job in the same industry). Similarly, enhanced levels of disclosure allow
industry manufacturers and physicians to police the market and assess market
deficiencies or opportunities for themselves. See supra notes 28, 271.
291. See generally Price & Minssen, supra note 246.
292. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 352.
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grants commensurate with their investment and clinical data
strength.293 Every biopharmaceutical must be approved as safe and
effective, but the investment and societal health impact vary with
each drug. A tiered system, with application specific regulatory
oversight, will properly reflect each biopharmaceutical’s value with
respect to societal health improvement.
Furthermore, potentially longer exclusivity periods will bolster
collaboration. A collaborative R&D group would create a fast-track of
biological product development,294 but it must consider issues involving
public rights to use this knowledge.295 With sufficient ex ante incentives
for members of the collaborative research group, public domain
knowledge can spill over to societal health, benefitting us all.296
High-quality
innovation
also
would
combat
previous
pharmaceutical manufacturing deficiencies and ensure that the
biological product market is poised for rapid innovation.297 Highquality innovation requires manufacturers to constantly reassess and
build new continuous manufacturing, monitoring, and quality-testing

293. Correlating terms with innovative inputs and value outputs. This provides
manufacturers with both more opportunity, less risk, and more predictability.
294. See Margie Patlak, Competitors Try Collaboration to Speed Drug Development, 102 J.
NAT’L CANCER INST. 841, 842 (2010) (“[T]he increasing complexity, amount of data,
and downstream effects on regulatory science is leading to the dawning realization
that nobody is smarter than everybody.”); Roe, supra note 4, at S28 (explaining that
in 2011, the National Comprehensive Cancer Network formed the Biosimilars Work
Group, taking a multi-professional approach to producing a consensus statement for
biosimilar implementation in the clinical practice); see also Patlak, supra, at 841–42
(describing how Merck and AstraZeneca joined forces to test a combination
treatment with two compounds, which provided a competitive advantage and
enabled the product to be developed more rapidly; they shared any intellectual
property resulting from collaboration but each kept the intellectual property rights
to their compound).
295. Price & Minssen, supra note 246, at 685; see also On Assignment: Hacking
Cancer, supra note 21 (“What if we had a system where all of the intellectual property
could be shared amongst the scientists so the breakthrough made in one place could
be used by someone in another place?” (quote appears at 8:22 in video)). The NIST
initiatives to use public-private consortia to generate fundamental knowledge and
place it in the public domain are likely to yield substantial benefits for both
competition and innovation.
296. See Roe, supra note 4, at S29 (suggesting that cost-savings driven by biosimilars for
supportive care will incentivize innovators to invest in treatments to manage the cancer).
297. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 344–45 (“[M]anufacturing
is largely noninnovative and relies on outdated techniques and processes.”); see also
supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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into the process.298 Additionally, there must be low process rigidity to
ensure manufacturers are incentivized to continue research and
development upon prior art.299 Manufacturers should not feel secure
when they can reap an ROI while sitting on their patent rights and
exclusivity periods—a system meant to constantly build upon
innovation of prior art. Constant innovation can be accomplished by
creating a separate validation pathway for process improvements,
requiring disclosure when firms fail to maintain manufacturing
quality standards (resulting in drug shortages),300 and eliminating the
“pay-for-delay” scenario when societal health benefits are minimal.301
Similarly, increased regulatory flexibility should be provided to
manufacturers through the BPCIA.302
Originators and innovators who have demonstrated excellence and
sound manufacturing process characterization should be the first to
capitalize upon exclusivity and patent protection.303 For instance, in
2010, Brazil developed a regulatory pathway dependent upon
biosimilar complexity with a corresponding amount of evidence
required to support efficacy and safety.304 Likewise, the FDA should
create a tiered system; exclusivity grants should be proportional to
the anticipated (and proven) societal health benefits, which may vary
during an exclusivity period. This would ensure that innovators with
sufficient capital are incentivized to invest additional resources where
they provide the greatest value: improving prior user rights. Even if

298. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 345. “Consistent quality,
smaller facilities, and reduced capital and operating costs” highlight the advantages
of continuous biopharmaceutical manufacturing.
Continuous Biopharmaceutical
Manufacturing: Can It Live up to the Hype?, INT’L SOC’Y FOR PHARMACEUTICAL
ENGINEERING (Jan. 4, 2017), http://blog.ispe.org/continuous-biopharmaceuticalmanufacturing-can-it-live-up-to-the-hype (hypothesizing that a 150,000-liter fed batch
capacity typically requires ten, 15,000-liter stainless steel reactors, while a continuous
process could function with ten, 1000-liter reactors).
299. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 344–45. In areas of rapidly evolving
science and incomplete knowledge, regulation itself must be dynamic and adaptive.
300. See Matthew DeCamp et al., Chemotherapy Drug Shortages in Pediatric Oncology: A
Consensus Statement, 133 PEDIATRICS e716, e718 (2014).
301. Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 7; see also Tucker & Wells, supra note 39,
at 102–03 (providing an overview on reverse-payment schemes).
302. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
303. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 352–53 (modeling after the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Voluntary Protection Programs).
304. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at S6 (noting that this scheme is meant to
incentivize innovation and increase utilization and the market for development of
biosimilars).
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innovators fall short of meeting all statutory requirements for a
patent or for protection under the BPCIA, proving enhanced efficacy
or manufacturing efficiency must still be incentivized when the
manufacturing process alteration potentially improves societal health.
Tailoring rewards for both cost input and value output help properly
reward and incentivize innovation.305 Thus, these innovators should
be able to fall back on, for example, a change in dosing regimen306
when it allows the drug to reach more or different classes of patients
and therefore supports an FDA grant of additional data exclusivity
illustrating societal health enhancement.
Lastly, Congress should create a framework that mandates
innovation in return for market exclusivity307 or continued patent
validity.308 Because competition within the FOB market is expected
to closely resemble brand-to-brand, small-molecule pharmaceutical
competition, innovation may not occur as organically with new
entrants in the generics market.309 Encouraging innovation, however,
will ensure quality-by-design processes310 and reinforce follow-on
manufacturers’ development of innovative analytical tools to
quantitatively measure improved quality.
Ultimately the only value that matters during the patent versus
trade
secret
decision-making
process
is
whether
the
originator/applicant feels they can obtain an ROI and capture
market share to set-up prospective growth.311
Biologics

305. See Sorscher, supra note 17, at 302.
306. Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (eluding to biobetters potentially
being a “once-a-day” dosing regime, which could treat the same indications “but in a
better and smarter way”).
307. Regulatory exclusivity for manufacturing methods may provide the industry
with the extra inertia to innovate. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at
349 (arguing that, currently, regulatory exclusivity has only played a role in drug
development and not for manufacturing methods); see also Price & Rai, supra note
42, at 189 (incentivizing disclosure with accelerated review and mandating disclosure
attempts to increase competition and innovation).
308. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 104 (recognizing “that brand reformulation
strategies (often called ‘product hopping’ or ‘evergeening’)” may result in “change[s] in
safety, purity, or potency”); see also Levy, supra note 235, at 276–79 (laying out how generic
firms may succeed on antitrust claims based on a product hopping).
309. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101–02.
310. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 346 (asserting that “quality
through testing creates major inefficiencies and slows the production” while quality
by design builds quality into the manufacturing process).
311. Potentially creating an independent pathway to validate new technologies
outside of the NDA and BLA process would provide ROI viability options. Id. at 353.
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manufacturing processes and the analytical tools that quantitatively
compare biological products are the backbone of innovation in the
biological products market. Because precision medications and rare
disease treatments require high initial investments, which are not
properly incentivized within the BPCIA, the biologics landscape is
poised for change. The FDA will play a crucial role, both by regulating
adaptively and by incentivizing disclosure proportional to high-quality
innovation.312 As science and technology advances, applicants will
possess more data to characterize the biopharmaceutical they are
disclosing; however, competitors will simultaneously need less
information to innovate upon prior art. Therefore, data exclusivity
grants are particularly important over the next couple decades for
ensuring consumers have the opportunity to use cheaper, biobetter
medicines in the rare disease medication market.
CONCLUSION
Generally, the pharmaceutical market can be divided into two types
of drugs: (1) small-molecule chemical compounds and (2) large
complex molecule biologics. Descriptively, biologic chemotherapies,
such as Herceptin and Rituxan, are referred to as “smart bombs,” no
doubt because of their advantageous structural and functional makeup. However, because of biologics’ complex, large molecule nature, it
is impossible to make an exact copy of a biologic; unlike smallmolecule chemical compounds where generic replicates can be made,
the best an FOB can hope for is a “biosimilar” label. R&D costs are
high because of biologics complex structure and manufacturing
difficulties. Thus, the BPCIA must incentivize biological product
enhancements—whether developed by the reference product or the
FOB sponsor—that result from improved manufacturing processes,
producing consistent, lower priced options for consumers.
The proposed incentive structure within 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B)
incentivizes a sponsor to pursue a ROI in accordance with specific
attributes of its manufacturing process. Within the current scheme, it is
feasible for a biosimilar to be similar enough to qualify as a biosimilar
under the BPCIA but not similar enough to be covered by a patent
claim. Thus, pioneer manufacturers should take care in obtaining valid,
optimal claims that afford broad patent protection of their biologics.
For examples of how biosimilars and biobetters are likely to dynamically and
strategically capture market share, see Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4.
312. Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 253, at 1063.
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Until now, the pharmaceutical industry has focused on patents that
protect the drug itself rather than methods of its manufacture.
However, if manufacturers could renew their data exclusivity period in
return for manufacturing improvements and additional scientific
disclosure, consumers will reap the benefits. Additionally, by creating a
one- to four-year data exclusivity extension opportunity, manufacturers
will feel more comfortable reinvesting their ROI in manufacturing
efficiency and manufacturers can capitalize on the complex-molecule
nature of their biologic by exploring manufacturing drift.
Biologics developed through biotechnology constitute an essential
part of the pipeline for medicines available to patients today and
continue to grow at an increasing rate. The legislature should
reinforce innovation and adaptation in this evolving area of science
by providing incentives for a more robust biologic disclosure system.
The manufacturing processes used to develop biologics are highly
valuable; some processes are protected as trade secrets while others
are subject to patent protection. Biologics are developing in
response to the inefficiencies of small-molecule pharmaceuticals, so it
is increasingly important that the biologics market does not suffer
from the same stagnation. By shifting manufacturers’ focus from the
risks of competition to the advantages of data exclusivity, more
consumers will prescribe to the value of biologics for their own
ailments and the same inefficiencies that plagued the small-molecule
pharmaceutical market will be eliminated.

